

---

**JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

---

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTED ITEM HAS  
BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER:**

**ITEM: 1**

**DATE: 7/21/61**

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:**

REORT OF THE AD HOC PANELN ON NUCLEAR  
TESTING

**PAGES: 35**

**CLASS: TS**

**LOCATION:**

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

SUBJECTS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING,  
SUBJECTS, ROSTOW FILE, 7/21/61-9/26/61

**BOX #: 301**



**SANITIZED COPY**

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Restricted Data*


REPORT  
of the  
AD HOC PANEL ON NUCLEAR TESTING

July 21, 1961

Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, Chairman  
William O. Baker  
Hans A. Bethe  
Norris E. Bradbury  
James B. Fisk  
John S. Foster, Jr.  
George B. Kistiakowsky  
Frank Press  
Louis H. Roddis  
John W. Tukey  
Walter H. Zinn  
Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.,  
Technical Assistant

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

This document contains restricted data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its transmittal or the disclosure of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.



WH S&T Cont. No. TS-107  
This document consists of 34 pages,  
No. 22 of 30 copies, Series B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

NSC Control No.21

~~TOP SECRET~~

## INTRODUCTION

At the request of the President, the Panel has considered the technical questions involved in a decision by the U. S. on the resumption of testing. The Panel's report is divided into two sections: (1) Present and future unilateral U. S. test detection capabilities and (2) Present and future U. S. and Soviet nuclear warhead capabilities. The status of intelligence of Soviet testing during the moratorium is considered in a separate supplement.

The Panel's task was facilitated by the recent report of the Fisk Panel to Mr. McCloy (2 March 1961), which covered these problems in the context of a possible test ban treaty. After reviewing such new information as had become available since the publication of the Fisk Report, the Panel found that it was able to endorse the relevant portions of the Fisk Report essentially without exception.

In submitting this report, the Panel hopes that it will clarify the technical issues involved in a decision on the resumption of testing. The Panel wishes to emphasize, however, that while these technical issues have an important bearing on this decision, the final decision on whether or not to resume testing also involves very important non-technical or military issues which have not been included in the Panel's considerations.

The Panel also wishes to express its concern over certain statements which have appeared in the press on the subject of resumption of testing.

NLK-00-2

SANITIZED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
By MAD NARA, Date 11/02

~~TOP SECRET~~

Additional material released  
as a result of this review.

Sanitized NLK-00-2 11/02



6C


TOP SECRET

- 2 -

While some of these statements have been technically highly misleading, they have still given a great deal of information on U. S. programs to the USSR. At the same time, the Panel believes that these statements have seriously detracted from the political gains which have resulted from our constructive position in the Geneva Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations.

#### SUMMARY

We do not know whether or not the USSR has conducted any clandestine tests since November 1958. While some suspicious activity which might be connected with testing has been noted, this activity is equally compatible with other technical activities not involving nuclear tests. The USSR could have conducted underground nuclear tests without providing any intelligence information.

Despite future improvements in our unilateral detection capability, the USSR could still carry out a limited number of clandestine underground tests in the kiloton range which would very likely escape detection. The USSR could also carry out larger explosions, even up to yields in the megaton class, at an increasing penalty in time, cost, and test effectiveness, and at increasing risk of detection. The greater the level of Soviet clandestine activity, the greater the possibility would be that it would be discovered through conventional intelligence, including 

Improvements in the yield to weight ratios of strategic warheads that may be achieved through weapons tests would give added flexibility to the

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

- 3 -

6c

designs of U. S. strategic systems, in particular with regard to reduced vulnerability and increased mobility. Proof tests would also remove possible doubts concerning the reliability of certain warheads. The significance of these developments is in part dependent on whether future U. S. strategy will emphasize deterrence or counterforce capability. At the same time, the status of Soviet weapons technology is probably such as to create a strong incentive for Soviet weapons tests, especially if the USSR desires smaller, more mobile strategic weapon systems to compensate for the anticipated loss of security of their present missile force when SAMOS becomes operational.

The principal areas of weapon improvements in the tactical weapons field involve: a) economy in the use of fissionable materials; b) reduction in diameter to permit interchangeability with conventional ammunition; and c) enhancement of neutron radiation effects. However, it is difficult to evaluate the potential value of nuclear warhead improvements to either the U. S. or the USSR since there is no established doctrine on the use of tactical weapons.

Enhanced neutron radiation weapons which would be relatively more effective against personnel under certain circumstances may have significance in tactical warfare. A prototype [REDACTED] which would produce some enhancement in neutron radiation at a cost comparable to a conventional fission weapon, is available for test. Pure fusion weapons [REDACTED] would, if technically feasible, combine enhanced neutron radiation


TOP SECRET



6c  
TOP SECRET

- 4 -

with low cost. If such devices can be developed in a militarily useful configuration, the most optimistic estimate for earliest availability of a first device for stockpile is 1965.



The date for operational availability would, therefore, not be appreciably affected by deferment of test resumption by a year or two. The significance of these developments is strongly dependent on the extent to which future U. S. strategy emphasizes the use of nuclear weapons in tactical warfare.

The present U. S. Nike-Zeus AICBM system is not limited by nuclear warhead performance or lack of knowledge on nuclear kill mechanisms but rather by the highly unfavorable exchange ratio of the cost of Nike-Zeus vs. increased number of enemy ICBM's, especially if the enemy employs decoys. The known vulnerabilities of U. S. ICBM warheads to potential Soviet AICBM defense can be reduced without additional effects tests; however, nuclear tests to search for overlooked sources of vulnerability may become advisable in the future. Increasing the yield to weight ratios of missile warheads is one method of improving the ability of our ICBM's to penetrate potential Soviet AICBM defenses by providing additional payload to incorporate measures to reduce warhead vulnerability or to carry penetration aids such as decoys.

One of the most important considerations in further technical developments is the possibility of surprises. In general, as far as yield to weight

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

- 5 -

improvements is concerned, surprises are very unlikely in the strategic warheads beyond predicted developments. There could, however, be overlooked phenomena in weapons effects of various kinds. In the area of tactical nuclear weapons, where the room for invention is large, the possibility of important surprises is correspondingly great.

The range of weapon development tests which can be undertaken would not be seriously impaired if only underground tests were permitted. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the restriction to underground tests would make some tests more difficult and costly. In addition, some weapons effects tests at high altitude of interest to (but on the basis of present knowledge not critical to) the AICBM problem could not be carried out if testing is only permitted underground.

In the absence of tests by either the U. S. or USSR, the U. S. would retain a degree of technological superiority in nuclear weapons for some time. If the U. S. continues to refrain from testing and the USSR engages in clandestine underground testing, the USSR could gain technological superiority in nuclear weapons to the extent discussed in the body of this report in as little as three to four years of extensive testing. If both the U. S. and USSR resume testing, the two countries will probably both approach the same general level of warhead technology in areas of interest in the relatively near future.

Although the limitations on our weapons progress imposed by lack of nuclear tests can to a considerable extent be compensated by efforts in other fields, such a self-imposed limitation would, in the long run, impair the rate

TOP SECRET

6c

TOP SECRET

- 6 -

of U. S. military progress. However, none of the specific weapons tests now discussed appear to be of such urgency from the technical and military point of view that a reasonable delay in reaching a formal decision on the resumption of nuclear testing would be critical. Therefore, any decisions in the near future concerning the resumption of nuclear testing can be governed primarily by non-technical considerations.

TOP SECRET




60

TOP SECRET

- 7 -

I. Unilateral U. S. Test Detection Capability

The U. S. nuclear test detection system consists of acoustic, electromagnetic, radioactivity and seismic sensors deployed around the USSR and its satellites.




TOP SECRET




bc

TOP SECRET

- 8 -



With sufficient incentive and effort, tests can be conducted underground in large cavities in order to "decouple" the seismic signal and thus even escape detection as well as identification.




TOP SECRET




TOP SECRET

- 9 -



Intelligence sources may, therefore, be useful in evaluating detected but unidentified seismic events. Although no specific experience exists on detecting decoupled tests, intelligence data may be particularly useful in view of the size of the effort involved in such tests. Since missile launchings can be detected with a high degree of confidence, the U.S. may expect to be aware of unexplained space vehicles which might be used for a space test. Hence, concealed space tests would have to be carried out under the guise of a different mission.

Thus, concealment tactics would be required to assure that clandestine tests with yields greater than a few kilotons would be successfully hidden from the U.S. unilateral detection system supported by other intelligence information. However, with such efforts, there is little doubt that identification or even detection by the physical detection system can be avoided.



TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

- 10 -

bc

[REDACTED]

The degree of reliance that one could place on such intelligence even over an extended period of time, of course, is impossible to assess. However, the greater the level of Soviet clandestine activity, the greater the possibility that the activity would be discovered through conventional intelligence.

## II. Present and Future U. S. and Soviet Nuclear Warhead Capabilities

### A. INTRODUCTION

Three situations have been considered concerning the resumption of nuclear testing:

- Case I: No further testing by either the U. S. or USSR
- Case II: Unlimited underground testing by both the U. S. and USSR
- Case III: No further testing by the U. S. and very extensive clandestine underground testing by the USSR to the maximum extent not verifiable by unilateral U. S. technical detection system.

Atmospheric tests have not been included in connection with our discussion of weapon development tests since restriction to underground tests will not seriously impair the range of warhead development tests which can be undertaken. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that restriction to underground

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

- 11 -

tests would make some tests more difficult and costly. In addition, restriction to underground testing will make it impossible to carry out some weapons effects tests at high altitude of interest to, but not critical to, the AICBM problem. In this connection, it should be noted that, while the U. S. has carried out such high altitude effects tests in the past and obtained important information, the USSR has probably not as yet conducted such tests. If no atmospheric tests are carried out by either the U. S. or the USSR, neither side will be able to conduct complete field exercises of systems involving nuclear weapons. This limitation would probably lower the degree of confidence placed by each side in their own nuclear weapons systems. The possibility of testing in outer space has not been included in either the case of unlimited testing or the case of Soviet clandestine testing, since these do not appear to be within the immediate capabilities of either the U. S. or USSR and, therefore, would not affect the capabilities of either country in the near future.

In general, it is apparent that under Case I, no testing, and Case II, unlimited testing, the nuclear weapon technologies of the U. S. and USSR would probably eventually tend to equalize. This would occur in Case I through espionage and information leaks, and in Case II through progress toward the natural limitations in the field. Under Case III, no U. S. but clandestine Soviet testing, the nuclear warhead capabilities of the USSR could surpass those of the U. S. in as little as three to four years of very extensive

TOP SECRET

60

TOP SECRET

- 12 -

clandestine testing. It should be noted, however, that in order for the USSR to surpass the U. S. in all weapon categories concurrently, there would have to be a very large number of clandestine tests which would greatly increase the probability that suspicious activity would be discovered by conventional intelligence, in particular once SAMOS is operational.

The discussion which follows concentrates on the characteristics of warheads for specific weapons systems. While there also has been an attempt to indicate where some of the unknown possibilities may lie, one of the most important considerations in further developments is a possibility of the appearance of actual surprises. In general, as far as yield to weight improvement is concerned, surprises are very unlikely in the strategic warheads beyond the predicted developments. There could, however, be overlooked phenomena in weapons effects of various kinds. In the area of tactical nuclear weapons, where the room for invention is large, the possibility of important surprises is correspondingly great.

The extent and significance of warhead developments under the varying test conditions have been considered in the following military areas: Strategic Systems, Tactical Systems, and AICBM Systems.

## B. STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

### 1. General

The significance of nuclear weapon developments to strategic systems cannot be judged in isolation from the other technical characteristics and the

TOP SECRET



6c

TOP SECRET

- 13 -

mission of the system. The effectiveness of a strategic weapon system depends not only on weapons design factors such as yield-to-weight ratio and fissionable material requirements, but also on such delivery system design factors as accuracy (CEP), reliability, and vulnerability to enemy attack, as well as on the level of intelligence on enemy targets and on enemy defense capabilities affecting penetration. In addition to those technical considerations, counter-force and deterrent strategies present significantly different problems.

A counter-force strategy is an attack against a large number of military targets, ranging from soft targets such as airfields to hard and mobile missile launch sites. A counter-force strategy here is considered to be either a first strike, pre-emptive attack, or a phase of an exchange between the strategic forces.

For such an attack there is a trade-off between yield and other missile parameters, such as guidance accuracy. For example, an increase in yield by a factor of two would be equivalent to a reduction in CEP by 20% or a 60% equivalent increase in the number of weapons delivered on target. However, whenever there is a question as to whether a sufficient force will survive an initial enemy attack, increases in yield would permit no reduction in the number of delivery vehicles and an improvement in capability could only be found by increased force levels.

The basic question about a counter-force strategy, however, centers not on yield or accuracy but on our ability to obtain precise knowledge of the

TOP SECRET



60

TOP SECRET

- 14 -

location of a very large proportion of Soviet strategic delivery vehicles. We do not now have this information on Soviet missiles; and, even if it is obtained on fixed missile installations with SAMOS, the problem of maintaining continuously accurate knowledge of the locations of mobile systems such as Polaris will be extremely difficult.

In a deterrent strategy, a minimum number of delivery vehicles (missiles or aircraft) must survive any enemy attack and be able to penetrate enemy defenses to attack cities. Survival depends on such factors as hardness, readiness, reliability, mobility, and secrecy. Decrease in warhead weight at a given yield has contributed to the mobility of deterrent systems. In a deterrent strategy, an increase in the yield of a warhead at a given weight would in principle increase the effects from both blast and fallout against urban areas and industrial complexes more than against hard or mobile military targets. However, warheads of present yields delivered with the CEP's of existing systems would so completely over-kill the population and over-destroy the floor space of urban area targets by blast and fire, that further increases in yields would produce little additional damage. Similarly, probable attacks would result in such extremely high casualty levels from fallout with existing yields that further increases in fallout would produce only small increases in casualties in the surviving population. In fact, consideration of fallout on neighboring friendly countries may lead to the use of clean strategic warheads, even at lower yields, in certain areas.

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

- 15 -

A deterrent strategy could in principle be negated by an appropriate combination of defenses (ASW, Air Defense, AICBM, and civilian shelters) or by making a pre-emptive attack against the deterrent system possible through intelligence information which could make information on a large fraction of the deterrent force available in 15 minutes or less.

2. No Further Tests (Case I)

If nuclear weapons of importance to strategic systems were stockpiled by both the U.S. and USSR without further nuclear tests but after extensive laboratory tests, the U.S. would retain some advantage over the USSR in the yield of warheads above [REDACTED], be about equal in the [REDACTED] class and have a substantial advantage in the yield of warheads in the [REDACTED] class and below.

[REDACTED] In the weight range from [REDACTED] suitable for [REDACTED] the U.S. appears to be [REDACTED] In the [REDACTED] class, suitable for the [REDACTED] the yield of the U.S. warhead would appear to be [REDACTED] In the [REDACTED] class, suitable for [REDACTED] the yield of the U.S. warhead appears to be [REDACTED]

As time passes and particularly as U.S. items go into production and deployment, some U.S. developments may become known to the USSR and in these cases the Soviet capability would converge toward that of the U.S.

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

- 16 -

With the current available spectrum of warheads, which could be stockpiled without tests, the U. S. would appear to have and to be able to maintain a very strong deterrent strategy by intelligent planning of delivery systems. However, the USSR would probably not be able to develop an advanced mobile ICBM system without additional tests. The U. S. deterrent may be reduced if the USSR succeeds in developing an effective AICBM which makes use of the large vulnerability of U. S. re-entry vehicles; this question is, however, not now connected with the nuclear test question.

### 3. Unlimited Underground Testing (Case II)

The nuclear technology of both the U. S. and USSR is sufficiently advanced in large weapons suitable for strategic systems that in the 1965-1970 time period weapon yields could approach the limits set by the practically available energy in fission and fusion reactions. In general, for U. S. weapons in the [REDACTED] conservative technical opinion suggests that the yield to weight ratios might be increased by [REDACTED] in systems compatible with delivery vehicle dimensions, while more optimistic predictions suggest that the [REDACTED] or somewhat more. In addition, within one year after the resumption of testing, the U. S. could establish the essential features [REDACTED] which would be available for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Extension [REDACTED] may be possible but would require tests over several years.

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

- 17 -

6.1(a) With respect to larger yield devices [REDACTED] several tests [REDACTED] would be necessary to establish reliability and an accurate estimate of yield and in the absence of such tests a more conservative design would have to be adopted. 1.5(4)  
1.5(4)

6.1(a) In general, Soviet weapons in the [REDACTED] range class could be improved by the [REDACTED] as U. S. weapons. However, Soviet capabilities in the [REDACTED] class might increase [REDACTED] and in the [REDACTED] class by a [REDACTED] in view of the smaller yields presently available to the USSR in these weights. In these weights, [REDACTED] it is probable that the USSR would achieve the same results as the U. S. although with a comparable expenditure of effort it should take the USSR about two years longer in view of the probable status of its weapon technology in 1958. 1.5(4)  
1.5(4)  
1.5(4)  
1.5(4)

6.1(a) In the case of a counterforce strategy, the increases in yield possible with unlimited testing would probably have the effect of reducing the counterforce capabilities of both the U.S. and the USSR. While the increase in yield for very large weapons through testing would tend to improve U.S. counterforce capability somewhat against a static enemy force, this would be more than compensated by the increased mobility resulting from the substantially improved yield-to-weight ratio for the USSR in the [REDACTED] pound class. 1.5(4)  
The Soviet counterforce problem might be increased in difficulty by an even larger factor by the U.S. development of warheads [REDACTED] 6.1(a)  
1.5(4)

TOP SECRET



60

TOP SECRET

- 18 -

permitting truck mobile ICBM's, ICBM's launched from air-alert aircraft, smaller Polaris-type submarine systems, improved [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] since the U.S. will probably have to rely more completely on mobility than the USSR. It should be noted, however, that truck mobile ICBM systems would still be possible with existing warheads. There is, however, considerable question whether such systems are desirable from the point of view of safety and adequacy of control.

In summary, continued testing would make a counterforce strategy more difficult for both sides through increased mobility and survivability of second strike force. Continued testing would increase deterrence by contributing, through lowered weapon weights, toward improving survival against an enemy first strike and penetration of enemy defenses. This would be a critical factor to the U.S. only if our deterrence becomes inadequate and if a decrease in weapon weight from [REDACTED] becomes the factor which makes the difference between an adequate and an inadequate deterrence.

4. No Further U. S. Testing and Maximum Soviet Underground Clandestine Testing (Case III)

If U.S. activities were limited to laboratory experiments while the USSR conducted very extensive clandestine underground tests, the USSR would probably achieve approximately present U.S. technology and could surpass it in the lower weight categories. In this situation, the U.S. would not be able to make any significant advances in strategic nuclear weapon technology and would essentially be limited to weapons in stockpile or going into stockpile

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

- 19 -

based on previously tested technology. Typical present U.S. capabilities are as follows:

The USSR would also not be able to make significant advances in weight classes since clandestine tests will be limited in yield and as noted above would have to establish reliability and yield accurately. However, in the the USSR probably already has approximately the same capability as the U.S. Under these circumstances, the USSR could continue development on smaller yield strategic weapons. In particular, the USSR could catch up to the U.S. in the weight class of in which they were significantly behind in 1958. This weight class would permit them to develop mobile ICBM's of the Polaris and Minuteman type. With further tests, the USSR might be able to achieve eventually in this class. The small number of tests at higher yields required to obtain full assurance of the behavior of a device of advanced design could of course be conducted either underground or in space, but with additional risk of detection by both technical and conventional means. It is fairly likely that the USSR could develop thermonuclear weapons

TOP SECRET



60

TOP SECRET

- 20 -

In summary, comparing Case III, extensive clandestine Soviet testing, with Case II, unlimited underground testing, it would appear that the U. S. capability for a pre-emptive counterforce strategy would be about the same in both situations since the USSR would be able in either case to develop improved mobile systems while our offense force would not be significantly improved. At the same time, the counterforce capability of the USSR would eventually be improved and the deterrent capability of the U.S. correspondingly reduced under Case III as compared with Case II, since the U. S. would not be able to develop smaller warheads to facilitate mobility or to permit the addition of penetration aids to existing warheads. The extent and significance of this change depends on whether U.S. deterrence is considered to become inadequate and how important very small warheads [REDACTED] are considered to be to assure survival of strategic systems or to assure penetration of enemy AICBM defense.

5. "Clean" Weapons

"Clean" weapons, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] constitute a special class of strategic weapons. While the reduction in fallout may diminish their usefulness in a deterrent strategy, it is possible that in some circumstances they would be useful to reduce fallout on our allies. With unlimited testing, both the U.S. and USSR could probably develop "clean" weapons [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET



6c

TOP SECRET

- 21 -

[REDACTED]

With no further U. S. testing and maximum Soviet clandestine underground testing, the present U. S. lead in large yield "clean" weapons would probably be maintained because of the difficulty in conducting high yield clandestine tests.

[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET



6c

TOP SECRET

- 22 -

C. TACTICAL WEAPON SYSTEMS

1. General

Tactical nuclear weapons are defined as ammunition for defensive and offensive systems whose primary purposes are the conduct of operations, (ranging from very small use of force to large operations), short of all-out war between the primary contestants. The weapons cannot be defined as to yield, size, methods of delivery or effects, but only as to purpose. Tactical nuclear systems can be considered in the role of a "deterrent" strategy to discourage enemy actions (either nuclear or non-nuclear) short of a strategic exchange. Alternatively, tactical nuclear weapons can be considered in the role of a "counterforce" strategy for actual use in large or small quantities on either a broad battlefield or in isolated limited engagements. There exist strong differences of opinion as to whether nuclear weapons can be employed in many cases without escalation into general war. It is difficult to evaluate the potential value of nuclear warhead improvements to either the U. S. or the USSR since there is no established doctrine on the use of tactical weapons.

The principal areas of weapon improvements in the tactical weapons field involve: a) economy in the use of fissionable materials; b) reduction in diameter to permit interchangeability with conventional ammunition; and c) enhancement of neutron radiation effects. Since particular attention has recently been focused on "neutron" bomb in the discussion of the resumption

TOP SECRET



6c

TOP SECRET

- 23 -

of testing, the enhancement of neutron radiation effects is discussed below in some detail in an attempt to clarify the situation.

2. Enhanced Neutron Radiation and Pure Fusion Weapons

Present very low-yield weapons [REDACTED] are effective against personnel mainly by the neutrons they radiate. The penetrating nature of this radiation is particularly effective against personnel inside tanks and similar blast-resistant enclosures. It results in a sharp boundary between lethal area and the territory safe for our troops, and therefore permits the use of such weapons in closer engagements. Reduction in blast damage and radioactivity on the ground would facilitate forward movements of our troops after the use of nuclear weapons. It is therefore natural to seek relative enhancement of these neutron effects. This can be done by attempting to design small yield devices [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Two entirely different types of weapons with enhanced neutron radiation have been conceived by the U. S. weapons laboratories:

[REDACTED]


TOP SECRET



60C

TOP SECRET

- 24 -



TOP SECRET



60

TOP SECRET

- 25 -

→ ||




TOP SECRET




TOP SECRET

- 26 -



3. No Further Tests (Case I)

If nuclear weapons of importance to tactical systems were stockpiled without further tests, the U. S. would have a wide range of yields,



TOP SECRET



60  
TOP SECRET

- 27 -

[REDACTED]

Although a considerable number of Soviet tests of devices which might be suitable for tactical warheads have been detected, it is quite possible that a number of tests of low yield devices suitable for this purpose have gone undetected. For those from which signals and debris have been obtained, and presumably all or most of these with yields greater than 5 KT have been detected, it has frequently been possible to estimate the nuclear economy and make reasonable, though not very precise or assured, deductions about the weight and possible diameters.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

However, with the accumulation of fissionable material, the Soviets may wish in the future to develop [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

With no further testing, it is expected that both the U. S. and USSR will not stockpile radical extrapolations from tested weapons.

[REDACTED]


TOP SECRET





TOP SECRET


- 28 -

By calculations and laboratory hydronuclear experiments involving energy releases up to about a ton of high explosive equivalent, both the U. S. and the USSR could make substantial improvements in the economy of utilization of fissionable material in one stage fission weapons, probably approaching more slowly the gains possible with unlimited testing.



4. Unlimited Underground Tests (Case II)

In the event that the U. S. and the USSR both undertake unlimited underground testing, both would probably eventually, though not necessarily at the same time, achieve approximately the same  ratios and economy of materials, as well as diameters and radiation effects in the weight classes in which they are interested. In general, the USSR in 1958 was probably three years behind the U. S. in weapons development in this area. As indicated above, in the special area of enhanced neutron radiation effects, 



TOP SECRET



60  
TOP SECRET

- 29 -

5. No Further U. S. Testing and Maximum Soviet Underground Clandestine Testing (Case III)

If U. S. activities were limited to laboratory experiments while the USSR conducted successful clandestine underground tests to the maximum extent possible, the USSR could proof test radically new designs, while U. S. developments would be much more limited in scope. In this manner, the USSR could possibly exceed present U. S. capabilities in low yield tactical weapons in a period of about three years of active testing. If it is assumed that the USSR made a decision to begin clandestine testing at the beginning of the present moratorium, the USSR could already have been testing in this area for two and one half years. By testing in this manner, the USSR could, over a longer period of time, achieve all of the foreseen nuclear weapon developments in the low and medium yield range (up to 20 - 50 KT) relevant to tactical warfare. This would mean that the USSR could, over an extended period of time, achieve the limits in economy of conventional fission weapons and thereby more than compensate for any relative deficiency in the availability of fissionable material.

TOP SECRET



60

TOP SECRET

- 30 -

consider the possibility of U. S. response with those nuclear weapons to which Soviet tactics might be vulnerable, as well as the possibility of escalation of nuclear warfare outside the existing geographical boundaries or even into strategic war.

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

- 31 -

D. AICBM SYSTEMS

The AICBM problem must be considered both from the point of view of increasing our AICBM defense capabilities and of reducing the vulnerability of our ICBM's to enemy AICBM action. Nuclear tests have a bearing on the AICBM problem in the following areas: AICBM warheads; kill mechanisms; and "blackout" effects on radars and communications.

1. AICBM Warheads.

The present U. S. Nike-Zeus AICBM system is not limited by warhead performance [REDACTED] providing the forthcoming Kwajalein tests verify the predictions on intercept accuracy. Thus, the potential increase in yield [REDACTED] in this weight class is not of great importance in determining the effectiveness of Nike-Zeus. The limitation to the usefulness of Nike-Zeus results from the unfavorable exchange ratios of the cost of Nike-Zeus vs. increased enemy ICBM traffic, especially if the enemy uses decoys or other penetration aids. Although the Nike-Zeus warhead costs [REDACTED] this cost does not dominate the cost of the defense system due to the large radar and data processing requirements. There have been speculations whether one could increase the neutron radiation from an AICBM warhead and thus increase its effectiveness. Although improvements

TOP SECRET



66

TOP SECRET

- 32 -

are possible, they are not believed to be of particular significance.

The USSR is undertaking a vigorous AICBM program; however, there is no specific evidence whether or not the USSR intends to use nuclear warheads in this system or whether it is based on the same concept as Nike-Zeus. While the USSR would have adequate nuclear warheads for a Nike-Zeus type system, they have [REDACTED] than those of the U. S. in this weight class. The USSR could, therefore, achieve greater relative reductions than the U. S. in the cost of the nuclear component of its AICBM system by testing either under the Case II, unlimited testing, or Case III, clandestine Soviet testing.

## 2. Kill Mechanisms

ICBM warheads are vulnerable to several different effects from nuclear explosions: X-ray impulse; neutron melting of fissionable material; debris impact, radiation effects on electronics; and blast.\* The theory of these effects is well known; some experimental information is available to the U. S. from earlier nuclear tests, and more detailed information can and is being obtained from laboratory experiments. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In view of the large back-log of information already available which has as yet not been applied to warhead design, nuclear effects

\*For an assessment of the present status, see Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Warhead Vulnerability to the President's Science Advisory Committee, June 20, 1961.

TOP SECRET



60

TOP SECRET

- 33 -

tests are not necessary during the next few years in order to undertake a program to reduce this known vulnerability of our ICBM warheads. However, the degree of reduction of vulnerability possible is severely limited by the [REDACTED] of our present deterrent missiles.

Although the USSR might be less aware of some aspects of these effects since they have probably not conducted any high altitude effects tests, the USSR should also either have or be able to obtain adequate information on these effects by calculations and in the laboratory for purposes of designing an AICBM system or reducing the vulnerability of its own weapons. Underground nuclear tests may be helpful to uncover unsuspected additional phenomena contributing to warhead vulnerability. In the longer run, over-all tests of the vulnerability of complete ICBM re-entry vehicles to nuclear explosions would remove some uncertainties; such tests would have to be carried out in the upper atmosphere and would be subject to uncertainties about detailed characteristics of enemy warheads.

There are a number of measures which could be undertaken to reduce the vulnerability of our nuclear warheads to these AICBM kill mechanisms,

[REDACTED] to accommodate modifications to reduce warhead vulnerability or to reduce the problem by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] could be achieved by improvement in the yield to weight of nuclear warheads. However, this could also be accomplished by such measures as the following: 1) improved propulsion systems; 2) larger missiles; or 3) the utilization of existing lower weight warheads with smaller yields.

TOP SECRET



~~TOP SECRET~~

- 34 -

### 3. "Blackout" Effects

The detonation at high altitude of enemy ICBM's or defensive AICBM's would cause serious "blackout" effects on certain radars and communications systems. The U. S. probably has more information on this problem than the USSR since the U. S. has conducted high yield tests at high altitudes while the USSR has probably not conducted any tests in this environment. Although the effects on some systems and equipment could be severe, the problem is well understood by the U. S. (and probably by the USSR). In principle, radar difficulties can be gotten around by going to higher frequencies, and alternate modes of communications are available. While more information on this problem might be useful, it is not critical to the operation of the Nike-Zeus AICBM system and could not be obtained by underground testing.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- 10 -

TABLE I

Weapon System	Area of development involving nuclear tests
Strategic Nuclear Warheads	"Proof" testing Improved yield/weight ratio Vulnerability effects tests
Tactical Nuclear Warheads	Increased economy in use of fissionable material Decrease in size to permit interchangeability with non-nuclear ammunition Enhancement of radiation effects
Anti-ballistic Missile Defense	Increased economy in use of fissionable materials Effects tests

~~SECRET~~

N44-10-88  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5  
By MP NARA, Date 8/10  
N44-01-301-1-1-5



---

**JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

---

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTED ITEM HAS  
BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER:**

**ITEM: 2A**

**DATE: ../../..**

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:**

**TABEL II**

**PAGES: 1**

**CLASS: S**

**LOCATION:**

**NATIONAL SECURITY FILES**

**SUBJECTS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING,  
SUBJECTS, ROSTOW FILE, 7/21/61-9/26/61**

**BOX #: 301**



- 11 -

TABLE IIExamples of Nuclear Strategic Warheads

Class		Can be stockpiled without tests	Can probably be de- veloped with unlimited nuclear testing
		Yield	Yield
Large (6000 lbs.)	US USSR		
Medium (1600 lbs.)	US USSR		
Small (200 lbs.)	US USSR		
Very Small .....	US USSR		

SANITIZED COPY



*Pastor* 3

~~SECRET~~

August 4, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Report of Panel on Nuclear Testing

In response to Dr. Wiesner's request I have reviewed the report of the Panel on Nuclear Testing and have given consideration to the course of action which the United States should now pursue in the light of the conclusion of the Panel that any decisions in the near future concerning the resumption of nuclear testing can be governed primarily by non-technical considerations.

On the basis of this assessment it would appear that the dominant factors to be considered in determining US policy on this question in the immediate future are those relating to the over-all posture of the United States as regards our allies, world opinion, and the USSR, particularly in the light of our general approach to the problem of Berlin. Our policy on the resumption of nuclear testing should likewise take into account the effects of any present moves both on prospects of realistic negotiation on disarmament, and on the longer-range military security considerations to which the Panel has referred.

On the basis of these factors it would appear to me that the most advantageous course would be to defer any announcement of test resumption until at least the end of the year, to reaffirm in response to questions, US freedom to test upon prior announcement, and to proceed with such preparations as are necessary to achieve technical readiness for weapons tests of highest priority early in 1962. The announcement in each case would be only a few days before the actual test.

If on the basis of the Panel's assessment it is concluded that an early test resumption would not contribute significantly to our immediate preparations for a potential crisis in Berlin, I believe that a deferral of this step would serve to increase support and cooperation in those measures of preparedness we deem most essential. I believe, too, that deferral of such an announcement would enhance our position in the forthcoming General Assembly, increase support for our

~~SECRET~~

WH S&T Cont. No. 1616  
Copy 42 of 50 Copies, Series B.

*Restricted Data attachment*

*Geo.  
Ball  
Comments*

*320*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6  
BY *MR* NARA Date *1/10*  
FPOs Vol. VII Doc. #51



~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

position in the Geneva test ban negotiations, and afford the most favorable circumstances for the US initiatives contemplated in the field of disarmament.

In the longer range, it seems to me, considering the possible risks to the security of the country, testing for military weapons purposes should be resumed if a safeguarded treaty ban cannot be agreed, although the final determination should be made in the light of the circumstances existing at the time. Accordingly, I would urge that while deferring an announcement of test resumption pending at least the achievement of a state of technical readiness which would permit the conduct of a significant test series, preparations toward that end should proceed forthwith. The achievement of such a state of readiness would, I believe, contribute to the flexibility we will need in timing any announcement of test resumption, since I am convinced we should be prepared to follow any such announcement quite promptly with an actual test.

Mr. McCloy concurs in these recommendations.

/s/ George Ball

Acting Secretary

~~SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLK-93-93-2

By SP NARA, Date 10/2/93

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

3a  
~~WH S&T TOP SECRET~~

Cont. No. 118, Cy 42 of  
50 SERIES B

U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Office of the Chairman

August 4, 1961

Dear Jerry:

The other Commissioners and I have studied the report of the Panel on Nuclear Testing that you forwarded on July 28, 1961. We are in general agreement with the findings and conclusions of the report. There are, however, two points which we believe should be brought to the attention of the President. These are our present state of readiness at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) for weapons testing and the question of "laboratory experiments."

With respect to test readiness it must be kept in mind that restricting tests to underground locations so as to completely contain the resulting radio-activity greatly increases the necessary preparations and time required for test readiness. It is perhaps not realized how little such preparation has actually been undertaken at NTS. While certain tests of specific devices could be begun within, perhaps, ten weeks, it would not be possible to execute a carefully planned and meaningful test series without additional preparations. The physical conditions of the site, rather than the program requirements, would in large measure dictate any test schedule. This situation can be changed only by several months of active preparations. Unless a comprehensive test readiness program is undertaken now, we cannot assure the President the flexibility of deciding to resume comprehensive tests on short notice.

We feel, therefore, that a greater degree of urgency should be attached to our technical readiness at NTS quite apart from the political decision whether or not to resume testing.

The second matter regarding "laboratory experiments" is also important in light of the Panel's report. As you know, we are presently conducting a hydronuclear program which is limited in nuclear yield to 10 pounds of high explosive equivalent. It is not unreasonable to assume that the Soviets may also be conducting a similar program of "laboratory experiments," but they could well be using a more liberal definition. Therefore, we feel that immediate consideration should be given to the feasibility of increasing the limit on the nuclear yield of our laboratory experiments. A limit of perhaps one ton should be considered. The report does discuss the gains and limitations from hydronuclear testing, but does not point out that the USSR could now be doing precisely those kind of experiments described.

Cordially,

/s/ Glenn

Glenn T. Seaborg

Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner  
Special Assistant to the President  
for Science and Technology

(This document contains  
Restricted Data as de-  
fined in the Atomic  
Energy Act of 1946. Its  
transmittal or the dis-  
closure of its contents is prohibited.)

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington 25, D.C.

Office of the Director

3 Aug 1961

Dulles  
Comments

Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner  
Special Assistant to the President  
for Science and Technology  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jerry:

I appreciate the opportunity to review the 21 July 1961 report of the Panel on Nuclear Testing. The Panel's conclusion that the nature of the intelligence is not adequate to provide definite proof or generally convincing circumstantial evidence one way or the other on clandestine testing appears to be consistent with the conclusion reached by the Intelligence Community in Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-9A-61 of 25 April 1961.

Those sections of the report dealing with the current status of Soviet weapons technology and the improvements that can be expected under varying testing conditions are also consistent with intelligence estimates on these subjects.

We consider the problem of Soviet nuclear testing to be a critical one and are continuing a high priority effort to obtain information on this subject. However, for the present we have no new important information to add to that presented in the Panel's report. We will, of course, keep you informed of any significant information that may be obtained in the future.

Sincerely yours,

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

WH S&T TS 117  
Copy 42 of 50, Series B

~~TOP SECRET~~

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6  
DATE 01-30-11-3-4  
BY MFP VAS 23 V10



30

~~TOP SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
Washington 25, D. C.

August 3, 1961

Dear Jerry:


In response to your letter of July 28, 1961, the Secretary of Defense has asked me, in view of the short time available for response, to reply for him. I am also enclosing comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the report of your Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing.

I agree with the Panel that we do not have sufficient evidence from any source to determine whether or not the USSR has been conducting clandestine nuclear testing since November 1958. For this reason, it seems prudent to assume that they may have been doing so. Accordingly, I would add to the Summary, at the end of the second sentence in the second full paragraph on page 5 the phrase, "from whenever they start(ed)," and to the end of the Summary, page 6, the sentence, "It should be noted that the time scale should take into account possible clandestine activities by the USSR since November 1958." The assessments of relative positions throughout the report, as on pages 15, 17, 24, 26, 27 and 32, seem to be accurate on the basis of 1958 data but do not indicate that the situation may be different now, as is clearly brought out in only one case on page 29.

The danger of closing off for a long period our own advances in nuclear weapons development, while the other side may continue, represents a greater risk if the arms race continues in other areas than it would if we could expect general arms limitation agreements. The Fisk Panel answered the questions about the technical and military effects of a test ban or a resumption of tests in the context that one possibility was a partially controlled agreement on nuclear testing, presumably to be followed by other agreements. Since the immediate prospects of arms limitation agreements seem more remote, the motivation for a Soviet violation of an unmonitored ban and consequent dangers to the U.S. appear greater.

Page 4 of the Summary points out that the significance of small pure fusion weapons depends on the extent to which future U.S. strategy emphasizes the use of nuclear weapons in tactical warfare. It also depends on future USSR tactics. If they emphasized such weapons and we did not have them, we could be at a distinct disadvantage, both militarily and politically.

~~TOP SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~



WH S&T Top Secret Cont. No. 116  
This document consists of 5 pages  
No. 42 of 50 Cys. Series B.

Def  
JCS  
Comments



~~TOP SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

On page 4, also, the unfavorable cost ratio of NIKE-ZEUS to enemy ICBM's is stated to be more significant than warhead performance or lack of knowledge of kill mechanisms. This is true. However, NIKE-ZEUS was designed to rely on known and conservative kill mechanisms and expensive warheads. If we knew more about the probable longer range lethal effects, the system might be quite different, and possibly much less costly. Furthermore, effects tests might show us how to reduce the vulnerability of our own ICBM warheads to a greater degree than we now believe possible. Thus, though my outlook for ballistic missile defense, at least of cities, is pessimistic, I believe that nuclear testing (and consequent warhead development) and better understanding of effects would have an important influence on both our ICBM penetration program and our AICBM efforts.

In summary, I find a stronger technical case for the resumption of nuclear testing than appears in the Ad Hoc Panel's report. I would agree that delay of a few more months is unlikely to have a substantial military effect, but over the long run (including the nearly three years since October 31, 1958) possible Soviet gains from testing must certainly be considered an important military disadvantage to the U.S. Therefore, the position of the Department of Defense, as previously stated by Secretary McNamara, is that nuclear weapons testing underground should be resumed as soon as it is politically expedient. Secretary McNamara's views were set forth more fully in the letter to Mr. McCloy dated July 28, 1961.

Sincerely,

/s/

HAROLD BROWN

Enclosure

JCS Comments

The Honorable Jerome B. Wiesner  
Special Assistant to the President  
for Science and Technology

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~



~~TOP SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

Comments of JCS on  
Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing  
contained in Memo for Secretary of Defense, dated  
2 August 1961

---

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Panofsky Report and agree with the panel that the report is essentially an updated Fisk Panel Report. In this connection, the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in reference b remain valid in relation to the Fisk Report. Of particular significance is the nonconcurrence of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy on the Fisk Report which contained views which were generally agreed to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the following comments on the subject report:

a. There are many points in the report which are considered to be inaccurate or which express opinions and military judgments with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree.

b. The report is based on unconfirmed intelligence estimates and therefore its conclusions with respect to Soviet capabilities are conjectural and subject to gross error. In this connection, the following are pertinent:

(1) United States intelligence sources cannot identify nor can they give specific information on a single stockpiled Soviet nuclear weapon.

(2) United States estimates of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile are based entirely on analysis of Soviet nuclear tests with no confirmation from defectors or from other sources.

(3) Estimates of the Soviet nuclear material availability are better than estimates of the weapons stockpile; however, a margin of error of plus or minus 50% is assigned the 1963 materials estimate. No margins of error can be assigned subsequent estimates because of their dependence upon actual production which, in turn, is dependent upon Soviet plans, policies and intentions.

1958-

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLW-93-94
By <i>[Signature]</i> NARA, Date 6/15/98

~~TOP SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~



## TOP SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA

c. From b, above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have serious reservations as to the validity of the conclusions concerning Soviet capabilities in development and production of nuclear weapons relative to capabilities of the United States. In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile is essentially unknown both qualitatively and quantitatively.

d. The final conclusion loses a considerable amount of its validity when the report states that the possibility of new surprises in developments exists in the area of tactical nuclear weapons. The conclusion also overlooked phenomena in weapons effects of various kinds, and failed to evaluate the potential value of such break-throughs based on the erroneous conclusion that there is no established doctrine for the use of tactical weapons.

e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot concur with the Panel's conclusion that from the military viewpoint there is little urgency connected with the U.S. resumption of nuclear testing, and that decisions in the near future on resumption of nuclear testing can be governed primarily by non-technical considerations. Earlier Panel statements that the possibility exists of important surprises in overlooked weapons effects and tactical weapon developments invalidates this conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that discoveries in these areas are potentially of sufficient importance that their unilateral achievement by the Soviets could result in a decisive Soviet military advantage. The fact that the US has refrained from pursuing these important discoveries by not testing since October 1958, while we have no assurance that the Soviets have likewise refrained from testing, makes the US resumption of testing a matter of great urgency. In the interest of national security the US cannot afford the risk of unilateral Soviet discovery of these important new achievements in nuclear technology.

"An important element in the decision to resume nuclear testing is the psychological aspect associated with world-wide fallout. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would like to re-emphasize the conclusions of the Chief, Defense Atomic Support Agency.

'The Chief of DASA desires to emphasize that world-wide fallout from past tests has not produced a biologic hazard. While contrary to some widely publicized statements, the above conclusion is based on a careful study of the problem. For many years DASA has conducted an extensive stratospheric sampling program. Data from this



~~TOP SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

program coupled with extensive surveys of levels of radiation in soil, food and directly in people have shown conclusively that the levels of radiation exposure to important areas of the body which have been created from past tests (including the radiation effects of ingested Sr 90, Cs 137 and C 14) are only a few per cent (2 to 3%) of the natural radiation background. These are even smaller than the fluctuations in the background exposure as one moves from place to place on the earth. In light of these facts, it is believed that the testing philosophy of the United States should allow tests to be conducted in any environment for which information is required, including if necessary, all environments that have been employed in the past. As far as fallout is concerned, care should be taken, as can easily be done, to insure that local fallout does not descend into inhabited areas. The conduct of the above-ground tests, which are proposed, would increase the background radiation by less than 1/10 of 1%; consequently, any biological effects from world-wide fallout would be insignificant.'

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their views on the necessity for the resumption of nuclear testing."

~~TOP SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~



W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 4, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible public announcement by United States that we would be willing to forego any tests in the atmosphere without the right of inspection or control if the Soviets would do likewise

As of the present time, it is planned that Ambassador Dean should return to the nuclear test ban conference at Geneva on August 23, after first having conference with the President who is announcing that he is asking him to return.

The nuclear test ban item has been inscribed on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly at our request.

The various embassies are engaged in explaining to the governments to which they are accredited, the provisions of the nuclear test ban treaty as proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States at Geneva on April 18, 1961.

A public relations program has been undertaken to explain this treaty and why it constitutes the best answer to the ending of further nuclear testing.

Efforts will be undertaken to persuade the delegations from other countries that the position of the United States with respect to the nuclear test ban treaty is a sound and fair one and every effort will be made to enlist their support on the basis of this treaty.

While it is realized that a unilateral announcement by the United States that it is willing to forego further

testing

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

testing in the atmosphere if the U.S.S.R. will also agree puts us in a favorable light as far as our willingness to stop testing is concerned, from a practical standpoint, it has at least three disadvantages.

These disadvantages are: Based on conversation between Mr. McCloy and Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Khrushchev will attempt to downgrade the currency of our offer by stating not only will the Soviet Union agree not to test in the atmosphere without effective inspection or controls but that it will also agree not to test in outer space, on or under the ocean, or below ground without inspection or control. Somewhere in their reply they will probably denounce us for wishing to include decoupling shots in our seismic research program during the proposed three-year moratorium on underground tests yielding below 4.75, and again repeat the charge that in our proposal we are not in any way obligated to continue the moratorium on such tests or to reduce the treaty threshold below 4.75 without regard to the actual outcome of the seismic research program. It is believed that they already intend to carry on an attack on our proposed treaty and on the proposed three-year moratorium because so far we have not been willing to bind ourselves by treaty language as to what we would do at the end of the three-year period with respect to the treaty threshold.

Consequently, it is believed that an offer on our part not to test in the atmosphere without inspection or controls may not only give the Soviets an opportunity to denounce our present request for inspection and controls as unnecessary from a scientific standpoint and as constituting only espionage but it will also confuse our friends and retard our campaign to get them to support us on the treaty. Those who do not wish to antagonize the U.S.S.R. will naturally not support us on the provisions of the treaty if we are willing to compromise on much less by our announcement with respect to atmospheric testing.

As you know, President Eisenhower proposed to Premier Khrushchev on April 13, 1959 that we suspend nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere up to 50 kilometers while the other treaty provisions were being resolved.

On April

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

On April 23, 1959, Premier Khrushchev replied that such a proposal was a "dishonest deal" and that they were "for the cessation of all types of nuclear weapons tests -- in the air, underground, under water, and at high altitude."

I am informed that on the present state of our knowledge, there is a "good possibility" that we could pick up and detect nuclear detonations in the atmosphere yielding from one to five kilotons.

With respect to nuclear detonations on the ocean and occurring in the Northern Hemisphere, I understand we have only a fair chance of detecting them.

With respect to nuclear detonations under the ocean, I understand, as of the present time, we have little or no capability of detection.

With respect to nuclear detonations on the ocean south of the equator, there is little possibility that we could detect them. The status in underground testing is known to you.

All of the foregoing is, of course, based upon the present state of our knowledge.

Some of the reporting telegrams from the embassies which have been explaining the nuclear test ban conference to the governments to which the Ambassadors are credited, have been reporting that some of them find it difficult to understand why we attach such importance to the possibility the Russians might violate the test ban agreement and that they consider our emphasis on need for control and inspection as exaggerated and that a more generous show of confidence would give us greater protection than our current attempts to achieve an elaborate system.

It is, of course, difficult to explain what the Soviets might achieve by further undetected testing because of security reasons. It is also difficult to explain the necessity for the large number of control stations around the earth, the need for the number of annual on-site inspections and the need for setting up the proper criteria for inspection and the need for having objective inspection teams.

Consequently,

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

Consequently, whatever public advantage might be gained by making the offer not to test in the atmosphere would, I believe, be more than offset by withdrawal of support for the treaty and might tend to confirm what appears to be a latent belief that our present treaty control system is too vast and too complex.

Therefore, I would urge that no announcement with respect to suspension of tests in the atmosphere be made until after we have completed our presentation before the United Nations General Assembly and have taken the vote thereon.

*Arthur H. Dean*

Arthur H. Dean  
Chairman, U.S. Delegation  
Nuclear Test Ban Talks

CONFIDENTIAL



W. W. Rostk

**TOP SECRET**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

7 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Report of Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing

1. The subject report limits itself to the technical questions involved in a decision by the United States on the resumption of testing. However, the paper needs to be read with an eye to the military strategy which the United States intends to pursue in order to determine the attitude on testing which is most favorable to that strategy.

2. The USSR enjoys important military advantages which we need to offset. In the field of strategic weapons, they have the option of a first strike against a known target system and have a better defense against our retaliatory reaction which will eventually include an anti-missile missile probably deployed some years before we can have one of our own. To offset these advantages we need light, high yield warheads adapted to a mobile delivery missile system as well as to the requirements of small multiple warheads and decoys.

3. In the tactical field, the Sino-Soviet Bloc has a very considerable superiority in trained military manpower with which to oppose the United States and its Allies on the ground. The primary requirement for effective tactical weapons in our hands is to offset this manpower. Even though the USSR also had tactical nuclear weapons as good as our own, the net effect would be to reduce the amount of manpower that could be employed safely in the combat zone. Then, it becomes like a football game in which, regardless of a disparity of size of the squads, only eleven men can be played at a time by either side.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6  
NLS-08-325h  
By 400 NARA Date 6/09



~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

Effective tactical weapons in our hands which are cheap, adaptable to delivery systems that can also use conventional weapons, and which are discriminatory in their destructive effect can provide the United States for the first time with an answer to Soviet manpower without our living in a condition of permanent mobilization.

4. In summary, the pros and cons of testing look differently if we consider the requirements for testing derived from U.S. military strategy.

a. If we are to absorb the first strike, we need a secure retaliatory force, which is mobile and uses lightweight warheads. Further testing is essential to develop such warheads without sacrifice of required yield.

b. If we must conclude that the USSR will beat us to an anti-missile missile, again it is important to test to develop lighter warheads. These will be necessary to permit decoys and multiple warheads to defeat the Soviet AICM.

c. If we are to have the best of tactical weapons with the characteristics described in paragraph 3 above, we need to resume testing. Although we are not without tactical weapons now, they are generally too large and their aggregate effect too destructive for generalized use in friendly territory. For the safety of our own forces and for the protection of the friendly populations among which we expect to operate, it is more important to us than to the Soviets to perfect very small atomic weapons.

d. Thus, a failure to resume testing seriously retards progress in developing both light strategic warheads and very small atomic weapons. Because of our military strategy, progress in both these fields is worth more to us than to the USSR. This fact argues for a resumption of testing at once unless the most compelling of political arguments can be adduced against it.

Maxwell D. Taylor



SECRET

6  
w w r  
August 31, 1961

McGB

Good News Instead of Bad

One of my few claims to expertise is that of being at least as savvy on the Soviet military posture as anyone in the US Government. Hence, while I cannot fully document what are essentially matters of judgment, I speak with more than just deep conviction.

Insofar as it has military significance, Soviet resumption of nuclear testing is a confession of weakness rather than a move from strength.

One can imagine the pressure of the Soviet military on Khrushchev, arguing that if things were heading toward a possible show-down with the US, the USSR was not adequately prepared (not that nuclear tests could be translated into ready strength for a year or so except for proof testing of stockpile designs).

The very shrillness and constant reiteration of Khrushchev's threats about intercontinental rockets and 100 megaton bombs smacks of counting as two in the hand what is really one in the bush. It is standard Soviet technique to begin making propaganda hay while they are still in the R and D stage. Indeed, it is a technique we use quite often ourselves. Paradoxical though it may seem, Khrushchev's repeated beating of the military drum connotes to me weakness and uneasiness rather than strength and confidence.

I have long suspected (and find Jerry Wiesner speculating along same lines) that the Soviet passion for secrecy is designed to conceal considerable military weakness. Not that the Soviets aren't awfully good in some fields, but they are not as good as they say they are.

There are serious gaps in their posture which they regard it as essential to conceal (I am told the majority intelligence community view is that the Soviets now have no more than 50 ICBMs, enough to wreak havoc but not enough to win a war in any militarily meaningful way (this

SECRET

NLK-01R-301-1-1-5  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5  
NLK-01-301-1-5-2  
By MRP NARA, Date 11/12



6

~~SECRET~~

2.

criteria may not seem valid any longer but military men, Soviets included, still think in these terms). Thus we are still in a bomber environment, in which we are well ahead of them.

Even if their strategic capabilities were equal to ours (which as yet they are not) I am sure that, believing victory to be historically inevitable, they do not want the USSR reduced to nuclear ashes while Mao harvests the fruits. Hence I believe that the Soviets are determined not to let the Berlin crisis lead to all-out war.

In any event, Khrushchev thinks primarily in terms of political rather than military warfare. Thus I see his test resumption, along with their other threats and rocket rattling, as largely part of a war of nerves to soften us up.

I feel strongly that we should find ways and means of conveying privately to Moscow our confidence that we retain strategic superiority and that he knows as well as we who would come out victorious in a war, for whatever "victory" was worth. We don't do enough cool analysis of Khrushchev's mentality, and of the way in which the techniques which he thinks will be effective on us can also be effective on him.

RWK

~~SECRET~~



W a R

SECRET

August 31, 1961

McGB

The USSR's test resumption has several implications for our current disarmament moves.

Above all, we must not let Soviets wiggle out from under odium of test resumption by appearing to embrace us on general disarmament, thus creating false hopes.

The first problem is in bilaterals starting ~~Wednesday~~ in New York. We have prepared a revised set of "principles" which deliberately try to borrow as much as possible of Soviet version tabled by Zorin in Moscow. If Soviets suddenly buy ours, thus forcing us to present a joint version to UNGA, it will create an illusion of movement toward disarmament which may diffuse the impact of renewed Soviet testing.

At a minimum we should put in a stop action to prevent this from happening until we've thought it through. By talking about adequate controls, etc. we can easily make our draft unacceptable to them.

I still think we should make a bold play on GCD. For us to be forthcoming will contrast all the more sharply with Soviet actions. But we can simultaneously lambaste Soviets even harder for no real interest in disarmament.

Despite the arguments for announcing early US test resumption, let's consider opposite case. The Belgrade neutrals may well issue appeal to stop testing. Why not let Soviets stew in this by not immediately announcing resumption ourselves? Instead why not announce solely that we are undertaking preparations and will decide shortly whether Soviet actions compel us to do so. I don't see why this betokens weakness, especially if President says a short delay will not be militarily significant.

Indeed, let's at least consider a last JFK/Macmillan appeal to Soviets to sign test treaty. Why not rub it in?

Finally, would our position look better if we held off actual testing through UNGA? I suspect disadvantages outweigh advantages here. We



~~SECRET~~

2.

don't want Nehru et al to build up a head of steam against our resumption while Soviets run off a quick test series.

But let's at least consider the values in looking peaceful while they look warlike, especially if it will take us several weeks to resume tests. Why give up too quickly opportunity they've given us to look good at their expense, unless concern over looking too feeble is overriding here.

RWK

cc: Mr. Rostow  
Mr. Schlesinger



---

**JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

---

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTED ITEM HAS  
BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER:**

**ITEM: 8**

**DATE: 9/5/61**

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:**

**KOMER MEMO FOR BUNDY**

**PAGES: 2**

**CLASS: S**

**LOCATION:**

**NATIONAL SECURITY FILES**

**SUBJECTS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING,  
ROSTOW FILE, 7/21/61-9/26/61**

**BOX #: 301**



*Nuclear testing*

9

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:

AFCIN-Y

SUBJECT:

6 September 1961

TO: Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
Deputy Special Assistant to the  
President  
The White House  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Walt

Thank God that the right decision was made -- I hope we never fall again into a similar trap.

Now, balancing moves in the direction of positive values seem in order; for example:

1. Step up our efforts in radiation medicine.
2. Set up the planning office for agrarian reform I suggested to you previously.

I also believe a publically announced directive to develop "clean" nuclear explosives, initially for missile-air defense and ground combat, might be in order.

With my best regards,

Sincerely

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Steve", is written over the typed name.

STEFAN T. POSSONY



To Clifton  
From Smith

13

Note: Follows text report text of  
Soviet reply. It is not yet complete.  
It will be sent as it comes in.

24 OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~BULLETIN~~

~~KHRUSHCHEV REPLY~~

~~MOSCOW TASS IN RUSSIAN TO SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA 1315 9 SEP 61 M~~

~~(TASS EMBARGOED FOR LOCAL RADIO UNTIL 1800 HOURS MOSCOW TIME)~~

~~TO ALL REPUBLICAN, KRAY, AND OBLAST GENERAL PARTY NEWSPAPERS:~~

*Quote*  
DECLARATION OF N.S. KHRUSHCHEV, CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF  
MINISTER.

(TEXT) THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS STUDIED THE JOINT STATEMENT  
OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN  
OF 3 SEPTEMBER OF THIS YEAR ON THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON  
TESTS. HOW CAN ONE EVALUATE SUCH A STATEMENT?

(MORE)

FBIS 9 SEP 944A LEM/DF



[2]

27 OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FIRST ADD 24 (KHRUSHCHEV REPLY)

X X X SUCH A STATEMENT?

(CONTINUING TEXT) PRIMARY ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE FACT THAT THE LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN HAVE NOT UTTERED A SINGLE WORD ABOUT THE ACUTENESS OF THE PRESENT TIMES OR ABOUT THE TENSE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE, ALTHOUGH IT SHOULD BE CLEAR TO THEM THAT THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR TESTS CANNOT BE EXAMINED WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO THIS ATMOSPHERE. J.

IT IS PRECISELY FROM THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND (BRITAIN WHO) CARRY OUT ACTIVITIES IN THE WESTERN MILITARY BLOCS THAT THE PEOPLES BELIEVE THEY CAN EXPECT A CLEAR AND DIRECT ANSWER AS TO WHEN THEY WILL STOP RATTLING WEAPONS AND STOP PUSHING THE WORLD TOWARD THE CATASTROPHE OF A NUCLEAR WAR. LEAVING ALL THIS ASIDE, MR. KENNEDY AND MR. MACMILLAN NOT ONLY SEPARATE THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR TESTS FROM THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM--OF WHICH IT IS A PART--BUT THEY ALSO TRY TO EXAMINE IT ALONE, AS IN A TEST TUBE WITHOUT ANY RELATIONSHIP TO EVENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE.

EACH LINE OF THE STATEMENT OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN REVEAL THE TENDENCY OF THE WESTERN POWERS AND THEIR ALLIES IN THE AGGRESSIVE BLOCS TO INSURE AT ANY COST UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE INTERESTS OF THE SECURITY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST STATES. AND AT THAT THE LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN HAVE EVEN TRIED TO REPRESENT THE CASE AS IF THEIR STATEMENTS IN THE JOINT DECLARATION HAD BEEN DICTATED BY THEIR SOLICITUDE FOR EASING INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND WERE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL HUMANITY.

WHATEVER GRANDILOQUENT WORDS THE LEADERS OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN MAY CHOOSE IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO DEFEND THEIR COURSE OF ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEY WILL NOT HELP TO PRESENT THEIR AGGRESSIVE POLICY AS A POLICY OF PEACE OR BARBARITY AS HUMANITY. TO CLARIFY THE AIMS OF THIS STATEMENT LET US SEE WHAT THE CONCRETE CONTENTS ARE.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT PUT FORWARD THE PROPOSAL THAT THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES, AND BRITAIN SHOULD IMMEDIATELY AGREE NOT TO HOLD NUCLEAR FWEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE BUT THAT THE QUESTION OF TESTS UNDERGROUND AND IN THE COSMOS SHOULD NOT BE TOUCHED UPON IN SUCH AN AGREEMENT.



10

[3]

IT IS NOT SO VERY DIFFICULT TO GET TO THE BOTTOM OF THIS PROPOSAL. IT HAS BEEN PROPOSED TO US THAT THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN--NOT TO MENTION FRANCE, WHICH IN GENERAL IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS PROPOSAL--SHOULD RESERVE THE RIGHT TO PERFECT NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FUTURE. THE QUESTION IS TO SEE WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO TIE THE HANDS OF THE SOVIET UNION EVEN MORE IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF ITS DEFENSE MEASURES. IN OTHER WORDS, WITH ONE PROPAGANDA SHOT THEY WANT TO KILL TWO BIRDS: TO HAVE THE BLESSING OF APPROVAL OF THE SOVIET UNION FOR THEIR MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN THE SPHERE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AT THE SAME TIME TO TRIP UP THEIR PARTNER IN NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIET UNION.

IN REALITY IT IS KNOWN THAT THE PROGRAM FOR THE CREATION OF NEW TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES IS AT PRESENT DEPENDENT ON UNDERGROUND TESTS--THAT IS, THE TYPE OF TESTS FOR WHICH THE GREEN LIGHT FOR AMERICAN-BRITISH PROPOSALS IS TO BE GIVEN. FOR SEVERAL YEARS AT THE THREE NUCLEAR POWERS CONFERENCES IN GENEVA THE UNITED STATES TRIED TO ACHIEVE LEGALIZATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS, WHICH WAS ONE OF THE MAIN OBSTACLES TO THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY OF TOTAL CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTS.

IT IS NO SECRET THAT UNDERGROUND TESTS HAVE LONG BEEN PLANNED IN THE UNITED STATES AND THAT THE NECESSARY SHAFTS AND GIGANTIC UNDERGROUND CAMPS (LAGEREY) ARE READY IN NEVADA.

IF MORE PROOFS WERE NEEDED TO SHOW THAT THE AIMS PURSUED IN THE COMMON DECLARATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN ARE COVERED BY WHITE THREADS, SUCH PROOF WAS GIVEN BY MR. KENNEDY HIMSELF, IN ORDERING THE RESUMPTION OF UNDERGROUND TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON 5 SEPTEMBER, I. E.: ONE DAY AFTER APPEALING TO THE SOVIET UNION.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN SEIZED WITH SUCH IMPATIENCE THAT IT EVIDENTLY DID NOT EVEN THINK, IF ONLY FOR APPEARANCE SAKE, TO WAIT FOR THE ANSWER OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN STATEMENT. DOES THIS NOT SHOW THAT RIGHT FROM THE START IT HAD NO INTENTION OF ACTING IN CONFORMITY WITH THE FORTHCOMING REPLY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO THIS STATEMENT?

(MORE)

FBIS 9 SEP 1030A LEM/DF



[4]

29 OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SECOND ADD 24 (KHRUSHCHEV REPLY)

X X X TO THIS STATEMENT.

~~CONCLUDING TEXT~~ THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN HAVE TRIED TO SHIFT THE BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTS TOWARD BANNING THEM ONLY IN THE ATMOSPHERE. FOR INSTANCE, THEY SUBMITTED A PROPOSAL SIMILAR TO THE PRESENT ONE IN 1959. WHY HAS THE USSR GOVERNMENT BEEN--AND WHY IS IT--AGAINST SUCH AN APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF BANNING NUCLEAR TESTS?

BECAUSE AN AGREEMENT ON BANNING ONLY ONE KIND OF TESTS--IN THE ATMOSPHERE--WOULD RENDER A POOR SERVICE TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE. IT WOULD MEAN DECEIVING PEOPLES. SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD GIVE PEOPLES A HARMFUL AND DANGEROUS ILLUSION THAT STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO STOP THE ARMS RACE, WHILE IN FACT NOTHING OF THE KIND WOULD HAVE HAPPENED. IN FACT, STATES WOULD CONTINUE TO PRODUCE--WITH THE APPEARANCE OF LEGALITY--THE EXISTING TYPES OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS, MAKING USE OF UNDERGROUND TESTS INCLUDING THOSE CARRIED OUT WITH SO-CALLED PEACEFUL AIMS AND IN THE COSMOS.

BESIDES THIS, THE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE RETAINED TO CREATE EVEN MORE DESTRUCTIVE TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE BASIS OF DATA RECEIVED THROUGH THESE EXPERIMENTS. TO BE SURE, THE MILITARY CIRCLES OF GOVERNMENTS PARTICIPANTS OF NATO WOULD ONLY RUB THEIR HANDS IN PLEASURE, AS THEY WELL KNOW THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH A PLAN WOULD BE GRIST FOR THE MILL OF THE NATO BLOC.

IN THIS MANNER THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE WOULD CONTINUE AND ITS DANGEROUS RESULTS WOULD NOT BE ANY LESS THAN NOW. CONCLUSION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT--WHICH WOULD UNLEASH ITS OWN KIND OF RACE FOR CARRYING OUT NUCLEAR TESTS UNDERGROUND AND, IF YOU PREFER, IN THE COSMOS OR UNDERWATER--COULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE PEOPLE, WITH COMPLETE JUSTIFICATION, A DISHONEST DEAL.

IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CANNOT AGREE TO SUCH A DEAL AND WILL NOT. SUCH A DEAL IS DESIRED BY THOSE WHO BUILD THEIR POLICY ON CHEATING PEOPLE AND ON THE GAME OF TALKS.

THE SOVIET UNION ADVOCATES THE CESSATION OF ALL TYPES OF TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHOUT ANY EXCEPTION, EVERYWHERE, AND FOREVER. IT IS PRECISELY AS A RESULT OF ITS EFFORTS THAT THREE YEARS AGO TALKS TO END NUCLEAR TESTS WERE STARTED BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE USSR, THE UNITED STATES, AND BRITAIN. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WENT TO THESE TALKS WITH THE HOPE THAT THE WESTERN POWERS WOULD ALSO SEEK AN AGREEMENT FOR ENDING TESTS.



DURING THE TALKS, THE SOVIET UNION HAS TAKEN MANY STEPS TOWARD THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN, AND YET AT EVERY SESSION--AND OVER 300 OF THESE WERE HELD--THE HOPES FOR SECCESSES DISAPPEARED JUST AS MIRAGES DISAPPEAR IN THE DESERT AS YOU APPROACH THE DESIRED GOAL. HOWEVER BITTER IT IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE--LOOKING AT THINGS REALISTICALLY--IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT TODAY THE TALKS IN GENEVA ARE AS FAR FROM THEIR CONCLUSION AS THEY WERE THREE YEAR'S AGO. [5] 10

IT MUST ALSO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION THAT WHILE THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN DAWLED DURING THE GENEVA TALKS THEIR PARTNER IN THE MILITARY BLOCS, FRANCE, BECAME AN ATOMIC POWER. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CARRIED OUT SEVERAL NUCLEAR TESTS AND MADE IT CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WOULD NOT CONSIDER ITSELF TIED BY ANY OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING THE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTS.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS POINTED OUT SEVERAL TIMES, IN CONNECTION WITH THE FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTS, THAT A COMPLICATED SITUATION WAS CREATED FOR THE GENEVA TALKS. THE SOVIET UNION WARNED THAT IT WOULD FIND ITSELF FORCED TO RESUME TESTS IF FRANCE DID NOT CEASE ITS EXPERIMENTAL TESTS. IT HAS BECOME APPARENT THAT A CERTAIN SHARING OF ROLES BETWEEN THE NATO ALLIES TOOK PLACE: THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN HOLD TALKS WITH THE USSR ON THE CESSATION OF TESTS--HOLDING UP THE WORK OF PERFECTING THE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS--WHILE FRANCE MEANWHILE EXPLODED ONE NUCLEAR DEVICE AFTER ANOTHER.

IF THERE STILL HAD BEEN ANY GULLIBLE PEOPLE WHO COULD BELIEVE THE ASSURANCES THAT FRANCE WAS PRODUCING NUCLEAR TESTS ALL ON ITS OWN AND WAS NOT ACTING FIN THIS TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE INTERESTS OF THE ENTIRE NATO MILITARY BLOC, THEN THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE ON COOPERATION IN THE USE OF ATOMIC ENERGY FOR MILITARY PURPOSES--WHICH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS JUST APPROVED--MUST HAVE DESTROYED ALL ILLUSIONS IN THIS RESPECT. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE RESULTS OF NUCLEAR TESTS CARRIED OUT BY ANY NATO POWER GO INTO THE GENERAL IMPERIALIST BOILER OF NATO.

EVEN NOW IN THE STATEMENT BY J. KENNEDY AND H. MACMILLAN THERE IS ONLY TALK OF THREE NUCLEAR POWERS--THE USSR, THE UNITED STATES, AND BRITAIN. AND WHAT ABOUT FRANCE? THE AUTHORS OF THE STATEMENT PROCEED FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT FRANCE WILL CONTINUE NUCLEAR TESTS AS BEFORE. DO THEY NOT REQUIRE TOO MUCH FROM THE SOVIET UNION WHEN THEY EXPECT IT TO AGREE TO SUCH AN IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION?

THE SITUATION IS AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT THAT THE NATO POWERS HAVE IN THE LAST MONTHS TURNED THE HELM OF THEIR POLICY SHARPLY TOWARD PREPARING FOR A MILITARY CLASH.

(MORE)

FBIS 9 SEP 1109A LEM/DF



[6]

10

33 OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THIRD ADD 24 (KHRUSHCHEV REPLY)

X X X A MILITARY CLASH.

(CONTINUING TEXT) WE CAN BEGIN EVEN FROM THE FACT THAT IN THE SPRING OF THIS YEAR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DEMANDED A GREAT INCREASE IN MILITARY ALLOCATIONS. NOW THE MILITARY BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES AMOUNTS TO OVER 50 BILLION DOLLARS. NEVER BEFORE HAS ANY STATE SPENT SUCH COLOSSAL SUMS FOR MILITARY PURPOSES IN PEACETIME. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY AN INCREASE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, THE CALL-UP FOR ACTIVE DUTY OF 250,000 RESERVISTS, AN INCREASE IN THE AMERICAN GARRISON IN WEST BERLIN, THE DECISION OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REGARDING SHORTENING THE DEADLINE FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NEW TYPES OF SUBMARINES AND ROCKETS, AND THE RECOMMISSIONING OF EVEN OLD AMERICAN SHIPS AND PLANES. SUCH FACTS ARE TOO MANY TO BE COUNTED.

MILITARY PREPARATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED NOT ONLY BY THE UNITED STATES BUT ALSO BY ITS ALLIES IN THE MILITARY BLOCS AND PRIMARILY BY WEST GERMANY, THE LEADERS OF WHICH--GUIDED BY THOUGHTS OF MILITARISM AND REVENGE--PERHAPS BUSTLE ABOUT MORE THAN OTHERS TO PUSH THE GREAT POWERS AGAINST EACH OTHER AND TO STRIKE THE SPARKS WHICH CAN PRODUCE THE FLAME OF THE THIRD WORLD WAR OVER THE MATTER OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE GERMAN PEACE TREATY.

BUT WHAT STRIKES THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC IS THE PROPOSAL TO CONCLUDE A GERMAN PEACE TREATY AT LAST. IN REPLY TO THE INVITATION TO SIT AT THE SAME TABLE AND IN A CALM ATMOSPHERE PROPERLY TO TAKE A DECISION ABOUT THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITH GERMANY AND THE NORMALIZATION OF THE STATUS OF WEST BERLIN ON THIS BASIS, THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE WESTERN POWERS HAVE LAUNCHED AN AVALANCHE OF MILITARY MEASURES. OPEN THREATS ADDRESSED TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES INCREASED IN FREQUENCY. ALL THIS HAS FORCED THE SOVIET UNION--AS THE USSR GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY DECLARED--TO DISPLAY CONCERN FOR THE FURTHER CONSOLIDATION OF ITS DEFENSE POTENTIAL.

CONFRONTED WITH THE FEVERISH WAR PREPARATIONS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, WE HAD NO OTHER CHOICE BUT TO TAKE SUCH MEASURES AS ARE DICTATED BY THE NECESSITY TO WITHSTAND THREATS AND TO BE READY TO MEET AGGRESSION WELL ARMED (VOVSEORUZHYYI). SUCH A NECESSITY HAS ARISEN AGAINST OUR WILL; IT WAS CREATED NOT BY US BUT BY THIS POLICY OF SABRE-RATTLING AND INCITING WAR WHICH IS NOW BEING CARRIED OUT BY THE MAIN NATO COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE QUESTION OF CONCLUDING THE GERMAN PEACE TREATY.



THE SOVIET UNION HAS DECIDED TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTS BECAUSE IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO OVERLOOK THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AGGRESSION UNLEASHED AGAINST IT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO FRIVOLITY. [7] 10

IN REACHING THE DECISION TO RESUME TESTS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS OBVIOUSLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THAT AT FIRST THERE MAY BE PEOPLE WHO WOULD BE UNABLE TO EVALUATE THE ENTIRE COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND WOULD SHOW THEIR WELL-KNOWN LACK OF UNDERSTANDING (NEDOPONIMANYE) OF THIS SOVIET STEP. WE KNEW BEFOREHAND THAT SOME PEOPLE IN THE WEST WOULD NOT PASS UP THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE PROPAGANDA CAPITAL FROM IT. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT HAVE ACTED DIFFERENTLY. HAVING WEIGHED ALL THE PROS AND CONS, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, WITH SORROW AND HEARTACHE, HAS TO DECIDE TO RESUME EXPERIMENTAL EXPLOSIONS.

WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT A GREAT MAJORITY OF MANKIND RIGHTLY INTERPRETS THE MEASURES UNDERTAKEN BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSES OF THE SOVIET UNION MEANS AT THE SAME TIME STRENGTHENING THE FORCES OF PEACE IN THE ENTIRE WORLD. AN AGGRESSOR SHOULD KNOW THAT THERE IS A RELIABLE FORCE ABLE TO SAFEGUARD PEACEFUL LABOR, FREEDOM, AND INDEPENDENCE OF PEOPLES.

THE JOINT AMERICAN-BRITISH STATEMENT TOUCHES ON THE QUESTION OF THE GROWING DANGER OF POLLUTING THE ATMOSPHERE WITH RADIOACTIVE MATTER. ONE CANNOT FIND WORDS TO EXPRESS HOW UNDESIRABLE THIS IS. THE SOVIET UNION IS TAKING ALL MEASURES TO REDUCE TO THE MINIMUM ALL HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES OF THE TESTS FOR LIVING ORGANISMS.

IT IS RIGHT, HOWEVER, TO ASK THE QUESTION: WHY DID THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, OR THE GOVERNMENT OF BRITAIN, NOT LAMENT THE POLLUTION OF THE ATMOSPHERE WHEN FOR SEVERAL YEARS THE RUMBLE OF EXPLOSIONS OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN BOMBS TAKING PLACE FAR FROM THE VITAL CENTERS OF THESE STATES--ON THE ISLANDS OF BIKINI, ENIWETOK, CHRISTMAS--DID NOT CEASE. ENORMOUS QUANTITIES OF RADIOACTIVE PRECIPITATION POISONED NOT ONLY THE EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE BUT ALSO INFECTED THE WATERS OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN AND, THROUGH THE PRODUCTS OF THE SEA, PASSED INTO THE BONES AND BLOOD OF COMPLETELY INNOCENT PEOPLE?

WHY HAVE THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN NOT FOUND A WORD OF CONDEMNATION FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WHICH, DURING THE COURSE OF NEARLY TWO YEARS, HAS POISONED THE EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE BY CARRYING OUT NUCLEAR TESTS IN THE SAHARA?

THE SOLICITUDE OVER THE POISONING OF THE EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE EXPRESSED IN THE AMERICAN-BRITISH STATEMENT PROVES ARTIFICIAL AND OSTENTATIOUS WHEN BROUGHT TO THE TEST. WOULD IT NOT BE MORE HONEST TO TELL THE PEOPLES WHAT REALLY AWAITS THEM IF EVENTS DEVELOP FURTHER IN THE SAME DIRECTION IN WHICH THEY HAVE GONE IN RECENT MONTHS AS A RESULT OF THE GROWING AGGRESSIVENESS OF THE POLICY OF NATO POWERS. EVENTS ARE TAKING SUCH A TURN THAT IF THE POLICY OF THE WESTERN POWERS IS NOT CHANGED IN TIME MANKIND MAY BE CAUGHT BY A WHIRLWIND OF NUCLEAR-ROCKET WAR. IN THE FIRE OF SUCH A WAR DOZENS AND HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE WOULD BE BURNED.

(MORE)



[8]

36 OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOURTH AND LAST ADD 24 (KHRUSHCHEV REPLY)

X X X WOULD BE BURNED.

(CONCLUDING TEXT) THE PRESENT POLICY OF THE NATO POWERS LEADS TO THE KNOWLEDGE THAT IT IS NOT THE RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT THAT HAS TO BE FEARED BUT THE FALLING OF THE ACTUAL NUCLEAR WEAPON--OF ALL ITS DEATH-BEARING AND DESTRUCTIVE FORCE--ON THE HEADS OF THE PEOPLES. IF YOU BALANCE THE HARM OF NUCLEAR TESTS TO THE HEALTH OF THE PEOPLE AGAINST THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MILITARY APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IT WILL BE OBVIOUS TO EVERYONE WHAT CHOICE HAS BEEN PUT BEFORE MANKIND TODAY AND HOW MUCH HYPOCRISY IS CONCEALED IN THE STATEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE WESTERN POWERS ON THE SUBJECT OF EXPERIMENTAL NUCLEAR TESTS.

NO, THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT AGREE TO RISK THE LIVES OF MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF PEOPLE. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR WOULD NOT HAVE FULFILLED ITS DUTY IF IT DID NOT FITTLINGLY LOOK AFTER THE SECURITY OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE. IF IT IS NOW FACED WITH THE DIRE NECESSITY TO RESUME EXPERIMENTAL NUCLEAR TESTS, THIS IS ONLY SO THAT OUR PEOPLE, AND ALSO ALL MANKIND, MAY NOT EXPERIENCE THEMSELVES--AS HAPPENED IN THE JAPANESE TOWNS OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI--THE EXPLOSION OF THESE WEAPONS UNDER WAR CONDITIONS.

THE SOVIET UNION IS STRIVING TO PREVENT PEOPLE FROM BECOMING VICTIMS OF ATOMIC, HYDROGEN, AND NEUTRON BOMBS WHICH ARE TALKED ABOUT IN THE WEST BY THOSE WHO OPPOSE THE REAL HUMANITY OF SOCIALIST SOCIETY AND OUR EXTERNAL POLICY MORE THAN THEIR OWN MAN-HATING POLICY IN WHICH PEOPLES ARE FUEL IN THE CRUCIBLE OF A NUCLEAR WAR AND THE MATERIAL AND CULTURAL RICHES CREATED BY THE PEOPLES ARE BUT POTENTIAL LOOT--MILITARY TROPHIES FOR THE IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS.

WHO DOES NOT KNOW THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS CARRIED OUT MANY TIMES FEWER NUCLEAR TESTS THAN THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, AND FRANCE? WE HAVE EVERY REASON, FROM BOTH THE MORAL STANDPOINT AND ALSO FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE SECURITY OF OUR STATE INTERESTS, TO CLAIM THE RIGHT TO HOLD, THE SAME NUMBER OF EXPERIMENTAL TESTS AS THE WESTERN POWERS.

EVEN THE LEADERS OF WESTERN POWERS OFTEN SAY THAT AS LONG AS THE ARSENALS OF STATES ARE CRAMMED WITH ACCUMULATED WEAPONS THE SECURITY OF EACH OF THEM DEPENDS GREATLY ON THE BALANCE OF POWER. AND IN THIS THERE IS A LARGE AMOUNT OF TRUTH. IF THE LEADERS OF THE WESTERN POWERS CONSIDER THIS JUSTIFIED IN THE INTERESTS OF THEIR STATES' SECURITY--WHICH NOBODY IS THREATENING--HOW MUCH MORE JUSTIFIED WOULD IT BE IN REGARD TO THE SOVIET UNION AND ALL THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, WHO HAVE TO LIVE IN THE FACE OF THREATS AND SABRE-RATTLING FROM THE IMPERIALIST SIDE?



[9]

10

IN ORDER TO DISPERSE THE STORM CLOUDS OF WAR AND TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES IT IS NECESSARY TO DECIDE THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM OF THE PRESENT TIME, THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL AND TOTAL DISARMAMENT. NOT ONLY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, BUT ALSO MANY INDEPENDENT STATES OF ASIA, AFRICA, AND LATIN AMERICA, ARE NOW COURAGEOUSLY RAISING THEIR VOICES IN SUPPORT OF THIS IDEA WHICH HAS WON THE MINDS OF ALL TO WHOM THE CAUSE OF PEACE IS DEAR.

THIS IS SHOWN BY THE RESULTS OF THE JUST-ENDED BELGRADED CONFERENCE OF 25 STATES WHICH DID NOT ALIGN THEMSELVES WITH MILITARY BLOCS--THE CONFERENCE WHICH HAS MADE A GOOD CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAUSE OF BETTERING THE FORCES OF WAR AND STRENGTHENING THE FORCES OF PEACE. HE WHO KNOWS HOW TO LOOK TRUTH IN THE FACE WILL ADMIT THAT THE ENDING OF NUCLEAR TESTING FOREVER AND EVERYWHERE IS NOW ONLY CONCEIVABLE ON THE BASIS OF UNIVERSAL AND TOTAL DISARMAMENT. (PASSAGE UNDERLINED--ED.). AFTER DECIDING THIS PROBLEM NOBODY WOULD BE TEMPTED TO HOLD NUCLEAR TESTS ON THE GROUND, UNDERGROUND, IN THE ATMOSPHERE, OR IN THE COSMOS. AND, AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE WOULD BE NOTHING TO TEST, AS ALL WEAPONS--AND FIRST OF ALL NUCLEAR ROCKETS--WOULD BECOME SCRAP. EVEN LIFE HAS TIED BOTH THESE QUESTIONS INTO ONE INDIVISIBLE WHOLE.

UNFORTUNATELY, AS SHOWN BY THE BILATERAL SOVIET-AMERICAN TALKS, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EVEN WANT TO DISCUSS UNIVERSAL AND FULL DISARMAMENT WITH THE STRICTEST INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OVER THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE SPHERE. BUT THEN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT--AND WITH IT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WHICH, JUDGING BY ALL (APPEARANCES?), TAKES THE SAME POSITION--ALSO SHOULD BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FACT THAT THE PROBLEM OF BANNING NUCLEAR TESTS WILL REMAIN OPEN.

IN ANSWER TO THE PROPOSITION THAT WE GIVE UP NUCLEAR TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, WE CAN ALSO TELL THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN: LET US DIRECT THE MINDS AND ENERGY OF PEOPLES OF OUR COUNTRIES NOT TOWARD WAR PREPARATIONS, NOT TOWARD FANNING COLD WAR, NOT TOWARD LOOKING FOR FALSE PROPAGANDA MOVES, BUT TOWARD TACKLING TOGETHER, WITH ROLLED-UP SLEEVES, THE MAIN PROBLEM OF OUR TIME--GENERAL AND FULL DISARMAMENT. LET US EARNESTLY AND HONESTLY STRIVE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF CONCLUDING A GERMAN PEACE TREATY SO AS TO HALT THE EVENTUAL SLIDING OF STATES DOWN INTO THE ABYSS OF ROCKET-NUCLEAR WAR. THEN EVERYTHING WILL FALL IN ITS PLACE: THERE WILL BE NOT ONLY NO NUCLEAR TESTING BUT ALSO NO THREAT OF A NUCLEAR ATOM WAR ITSELF.

ONE DOES NOT HAVE TO BE A PROPHET TO SAY THAT RUSSIANS AND AMERICAN, CZECHS AND ENGLISH, ARABS AND INDIANS--ALL PEOPLES OF THE WORLD--WOULD FOREVER HOLD IN GRATEFUL MEMORY THOSE STATESMEN, THOSE GOVERNMENTS, WHO SPARED NO EFFORTS TOWARD ACHIEVING UNIVERSAL AND FULL DISARMAMENT AND SAVING MANKIND FROM WAR ONCE AND FOR ALL.



AND ON THE CONTRARY, IF THIS PROBLEM REMAINS UNSOLVED THE PEOPLE WILL CURSE THOSE WHO USED THEIR POSITION AND THEIR POWER TO MAINTAIN THE FEVER OF MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND THE CONSTANT THREAT OF NUCLEAR ROCKET WAR. THEY WILL EQUALLY NEVER FORGIVE THEM IF EVERYTHING NECESSARY IS NOT DONE TO DRAW A FINAL LINE UNDER WORLD WAR II TO CONCLUDE A PEACE TREATY WITH GERMANY WHICH WOULD FREE THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE, AND NOT ONLY OF EUROPE, FROM FEAR AND WORRY FOR THE NEXT DAY AND GIVE THEM A CALM AND A PEACEFUL LIFE.

UNIVERSAL AND TOTAL DISARMAMENT, WITH THE LIQUIDATION OF ALL THE MILITARY MACHINERY OF THE STATES; THE IMMEDIATE CONCLUSION OF THE GERMAN PEACE TREATY; AND DRAWING A LINE UNDER WORLD WAR II--THESE CONSTITUTE, IN THE PRESENT CONDITIONS, THE DIRECT ROAD TOWARD LIBERATING THE PEOPLES FROM WARS AND THE MISFORTUNES AND CALAMITIES WHICH THEY BRING TO PEOPLE.

WE URGE THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN TO TAKE THIS ROAD.

9 SEPTEMBER 1961. MOSCOW.

(THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION OF N. S. KHRUSHCHEV, CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, WHICH HAS JUST BEEN TRANSMITTED HAS BEEN HANDED ON 9 SEPTEMBER OF THIS YEAR BY THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY TO THE AMBASSADORS OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN IN MOSCOW.

(ENDALL)

FBIS 9 SEP 16P LEM/DF



Lois:

Your files?

Polly



INCOMING MESSAGE

# THE WHITE HOUSE



HJM

~~SECRET~~

9 SEPTEMBER 1961

DATE

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

FROM: WALT ROSTOW WASH DC  
TO : GEN CLIFTON FOR THE PRESIDENT  
INFO :  
CITE : CAP5240-61

PAUL DOTY, LEADER US DELEGATION TO STOWE US-SOVIET SCIENTIFIC MEETING CALLED ME LAST NIGHT FROM CAMBRIDGE WHERE HE IS SPENDING WEEKEND BEFORE RETURNING MONDAY FOR SECOND PHASE OF CONFERENCE. HE REPORTS SOVIET SCIENTISTS DEPRESSED AND DEFENSIVE. THEY SAY 100 MEGATON EXPLOSIVE WILL (REPEAT) WILL BE DETONATED IN THE COURSE OF PRESENT TEST SERIES.

I SHALL RAISE WITH GENERAL TAYLOR THIS MORNING THE WISDOM OF PLANNING PROMPTLY ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS OUR REACTION.

HE WILL BE ABLE TO CONSIDER MATTER WITH PRESIDENT ON MONDAY. THIS PROBLEM MIGHT BE A TEST OF GENERAL TAYLOR'S NEW COMMITTEE WHICH MET YESTERDAY WITH NEWSOM, C. D. JACKSON, ED BARRETT, STANTON, ET AL. AGENDA MIGHT INCLUDE EVERYTHING FROM THEME FOR AN IMMEDIATE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT TO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PLAN FOR INCREASING EMPLOYMENT OF GLAZIERS ON A WORLD-WIDE BASIS.

WITH CLEAR, FIRM AND PROMPT HANDLING THIS SOVIET ACT --IF UNDERTAKEN-- MIGHT BE CONVERTED INTO A KIND OF GLOBAL PSYCHOLOGICAL REVOLT AGAINST NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL. QUESTION OF WHETHER PRESIDENT SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT RECEIVE SOVIET SCIENTISTS WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY OF NEXT WEEK WILL PROBABLY BE RAISED WITH US

DTG: 091250Z  
PAGE 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~



00

R 12  
M. L. Katov

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 11, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: Soviet Disarmament Proposal

Paul Doty called me from Stowe (Pugwash Conference) over the weekend to inform me that conversations with Soviet scientists led him to believe that the Soviets would probably make an offer of a European security scheme before the end of the month. This proposal would include many of the features of the Rapacki plan and perhaps some reduction in conventional forces in Germany. Its chief purpose would be to achieve the denuclearization of Germany. Doty said that the Soviet scientists were not sure whether the proposal would be made directly to us or to the General Assembly. They seemed certain that it would be submitted to the General Assembly in due course, whatever the initial handling. Doty said that he would rate the accuracy of his informant at around 50%.

*HK*  
Henry Kissinger

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

September 14, 1961

Mr. Rostow:

These papers will be the subject of a meeting in my office on Saturday, the 16th, at 2:00 p.m. I hope you will be able to attend.

*U. A. J. (ges)*

U. Alexis Johnson

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT



---

JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

---

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTED ITEM HAS  
BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER:

ITEM: 13A

DATE: 9/13/61

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

OUTLINE OF DRAFT CONTINGENCY PLAN

PAGES: 4

CLASS: S

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

SUBJECTS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING,  
ROSTOW FILE, 7/21/61-9/26/61

BOX #: 301

SANITIZED MK 01.301.1.7.0 8/15



13a

**SUBJECT: Comments on "Outline of Draft Contingency Plan for United States Response to Soviet Testing of a 50-100 MT Device"**

1. General. This draft is largely concerned with official statements to be made by the President, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense. The present comments are not concerned with the underlying questions of national policy or the presumable impact of these statements upon the American people, but only with their possible influence upon foreign nations and, more specifically, with the covert, unattributable ways in which such influence abroad can be effected.

2. Objectives. The draft names three objectives, i. e. (i) to prevent loss of confidence in the U. S. deterrent, (ii) to turn world reaction against the Soviet Union, and (iii) to stress that the U. S. will continue seeking peaceful solutions. While these objectives are unexceptionable, it is somewhat doubtful whether they are the most urgent or most effective objectives, where foreign audiences are concerned. The latter can be divided, in this context, into three groups:

a. Friends who may not doubt our military-technical capability to fight the Soviets, but who are uncertain as to our political-psychological determination of doing so -- like many West Berliners, Thais and elements of other allied nations.

NLK-01-301-1-7-0

SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5
NLK-01-301-1-3-3
By MYP NARA Date 8/15



b. Friends who, on the contrary, may be afraid that we will plunge the world into nuclear war, without a supreme effort at peaceful solutions -- e.g. sizeable groups in Britain, the Scandinavian countries, in India and elsewhere.

c. Neutrals more or less friendly or unfriendly, who do not, as a whole, understand the problem, but wish both the U. S. and the USSR would cease nuclear testing and reach any kind of agreement on Berlin.

d. The enemy (the Communists, including Khrushchev) may not question our military potential -- though he presumably overestimates his own -- but seems confident that he can frighten our allies away from us, even if he cannot frighten the U. S. directly into submission.

3. It would therefore appear appropriate to define U. S. Government objectives in this context -- at least insofar as foreign audiences, friendly or hostile, are concerned -- as follows:

a. To convince our friends that we are both able and determined to fight, if necessary, but that we shall exhaust all possibilities for peaceful solutions first.

b. To convince the neutrals of (i) the fact that the Soviets are the ones who started testing, leaving us with no other alternative but to follow suit, and (ii) the difference between atmospheric and underground testing which they do not understand.



c. To convince Khrushchev and the World Communist movement at large that not only the U. S., but her allies, too, refuse to be intimidated by nuclear blackmail.

4. General Approach. The proposals made in the draft are well taken. One should consider, however, whether it is advisable to focus such counter-propaganda on the 100-megaton bomb alone (especially before it is exploded and before we know as certain that it will be exploded) or to exaggerate its frightfulness, because this approach might actually play into Khrushchev's hands. Furthermore, the military consequences of current Soviet testing may conceivably require the U. S. to resume atmospheric tests, too, propaganda primarily based on fall-out and its consequences might backfire -- especially among audiences already prone to panic.

5. It might therefore be preferable to base U. S. counter-propaganda, especially abroad, on broader themes such as the following:

a. Khrushchev's resorting to nuclear blackmail confirms the bankruptcy of Communist ideology: if the Communists would believe their own allegations according to which the "downfall of imperialism is inevitable and imminent" and "the superiority of



the 'Socialist Camp' is irresistibly growing" (see Moscow Declaration of November 1960 and Draft of CPSU Program), they would not have to take the awful risk of total nuclear war.


b. Soviet resumption of nuclear testing -- contrary to their own pledges and ruining their "peaceful co-existence" propaganda -- proves not military superiority but vulnerability: their almost daily tests, obviously prepared many months before, indicate a frantic desire of the Soviet military leaders to compensate for U.S. advantages (smaller warheads, greater mobility, solid fuel rockets fired from submerged nuclear submarines, etc.). A 100-megaton bomb would not add decisively to the Soviet nuclear arsenal: its purpose is terror and intimidation rather than military advantages.

c. Khrushchev's promise of "perfect peace" once we have obeyed his demands on Berlin and East Germany cannot be taken seriously: it reminds the free world too ominously of Hitler's repeated promises that the Sudeten (or, subsequently, other areas he coveted) would be "his last territorial demand." If Khrushchev could succeed with West Berlin and the international recognition of Ulbricht's puppet regime by means of nuclear blackmail, he would use the same technique to swallow gradually all of Europe and finally the rest of the world, too. Resisting this blackmail is




therefore the joint vital interest of the entire non-Communist world.

6. Specific Measures. It seems desirable to supplement the statements, listed in the draft as #1 - 3 under this heading, with some visible and tangible actions such as, for instance

- a. public showing of Polaris firing from submerged submarines;
  - b. launching of a MIDAS satellite and/or advanced space vehicles;
  - c. dramatic acceleration of shelter construction in all major U.S. cities;
  - d. mass meetings in the U.S. against Soviet nuclear blackmail, of workers, farmers, women, students, veterans, etc., with appeals to their Soviet opposite numbers and to similar organizations throughout the world.
- 





8. In view of the fact that (i) explosion of such bomb may be expected very soon, perhaps within the next few days and (ii) such a big explosion might interrupt communications in a large part of the world (as even the far smaller H-bomb explosion in Bikini did) so that contingency guidances will have to be cabled before the event, it is urgently recommended that such policy guidance be handed down without delay.



~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

SEP 13 1961


DRAFT - WHITE HOUSE CONTINGENCY STATEMENT

The Soviet Government has succumbed to the temptation to explode an over-size thermonuclear device in a crude attempt to intimidate the world.

The device tested has little more destructive power, and no greater military effectiveness, than weapons now in the arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, however, our scientists tell us that today's test is likely to create more destructive radioactive fallout than that caused by all previous nuclear explosions, which yielded a total of \_\_\_\_ megatons of fission.

If the Soviet Union believed it necessary to have a weapon of this type, it could have been developed without the test conducted today. There is no technical reason for testing such a device beyond a relatively small-scale detonation to confirm basic design. (It also is interesting to note that this is the first USSR test to be announced publicly by the Soviet Government.)

Under these circumstances, we must conclude that the purpose of today's test -- and indeed the purpose of such a weapon itself -- is to attempt to spread terror and increase tensions throughout the world, and so to intimidate free men that they will timorously accept Soviet demands which reason rejects and conscience opposes. This attempt will fail.

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~



-2-

Terror is not a new weapon. Throughout human history it has been used by those who could not prevail through persuasion. They usually failed because, in most instances, they underestimated the strength of the human spirit. Those who would intimidate free men today should remember this. And they should remember also that the United States, which is committed to the preservation of freedom, has more than enough military power to destroy those who would unleash a war of aggression.

For some years we have had the capability to manufacture a 100-megaton bomb or even a 1,000-megaton or "gigaton" bomb, but we saw no purpose in doing so. Such weapons would not increase our capacity to destroy an aggressor. Today we have more than \_\_\_\_\_ nuclear weapons, \_\_\_\_\_ of which are in the \_\_\_\_\_ megaton range. They are more than sufficient.

We are prepared, now as ever, to enter into serious negotiations for disarmament. We are prepared, now as ever, to enter into serious negotiations for a treaty banning nuclear testing. We await a response from the Soviets.



---

**JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

---

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTED ITEM HAS  
BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER:**

**ITEM: 14**

**DATE: ../../..**

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:**

**ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LETTER FOR  
MR. ALEXIS JOHNSON**

**PAGES: 6**

**CLASS: S**

**LOCATION:**

**NATIONAL SECURITY FILES**

**SUBJECTS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING,  
ROSTOW FILE, 7/21/61-9/26/61**

**BOX #: 301**



~~SECRET~~

14a

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

ATTACHMENT #1

Re-Draft - White House Contingency Statement

(Nature and Purpose of Changes to Each Paragraph Indicated in Parentheses)


The Soviet Government has succumbed to the temptation to explode an over-size thermonuclear device in a crude attempt to intimidate the world.

The Soviet decision to develop weapons of this size has no rational basis in terms of military necessity. The device has little more destructive power, and no greater military effectiveness, than nuclear weapons now in the arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Present weapons accurately delivered have sufficient power to effectively destroy military targets. Thus, the Soviet decision means nothing less than crossing the threshold from military necessity to sheer barbarism.

Furthermore, even if the development of such a weapon were necessary, this could have been done without an explosion of the magnitude of today's test. There is no technical reason for testing such a device beyond a relatively small-scale detonation to confirm basic design. By testing on a full-scale basis, the Soviet Union has wantonly increased by a substantial amount the radioactive fallout and other hazards associated with the very large-scale explosion. (This re-draft is designed to reinforce the dual point. At the same time, it somewhat reduces the emphasis on the fallout point. Technically, it would not be true that the Soviet test would have created more fallout than all previous nuclear explosions.)

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~SECRET~~





~~SECRET~~

14a

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

Under these circumstances, we must conclude that the purpose of today's test -- and indeed the purpose of such a weapon itself -- is to attempt to spread terror and increase tensions throughout the world, and so to intimidate free men that they will timorously accept Soviet demands which reason rejects and conscience opposes. This attempt will fail. (Unchanged)

Terror is not a new weapon. Throughout human history it has been used by those who could not prevail through persuasion. They usually failed because, in most instances, they under-estimated the strength of the human spirit. Those who would intimidate free men today should remember this. And they should remember also that the United States, which is committed to the preservation of freedom, has more than enough military power to destroy those who would unleash a war of aggression. (Unchanged)

For some years we have had the know-how and the capability to manufacture a 100-megaton bomb or even a 1,000-megaton or "gigaton" bomb, but we saw no purpose in doing so. Such weapons would not increase our capacity to destroy an aggressor. Our efforts in the nuclear field now and in the future will not be directed toward spreading mass terror. They will be directed as in the past toward maintaining an ample stockpile of weapons adequate to the task of inflicting discriminate and appropriate military damage upon any aggressor. (This deletes the references to the specific size of our stockpile, in favor of a general statement on the subject.)

2

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

14a

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

We are prepared, now as ever, to enter into serious negotiations for disarmament. We are prepared, now as ever, to enter into serious negotiations for a treaty banning nuclear testing. (This removes the last sentence, which seemed to us weak.)

As a great nation commanding vast resources of power, the United States is fully aware of its responsibility for cool and sober conduct in matters which may involve the destiny of millions of people. At the same time, the United States will not hesitate to use its power in such ways as may be needed to protect its vital interests and those of the Free World against Communist aggression. (New)

The Soviet leaders should not delude themselves. They have failed to intimidate us, and they will continue to fail. We are taking and we will continue to take measures necessary to preserve the security of our country and of others who count upon our help. (New)

(These additional new paragraphs would conclude on the note of firm strength, rather than on the weaker negotiating theme.)

[3]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

146

ATTACHMENT #2


Draft Defense Department Statement

The Soviet Union has made known the testing of a thermo-nuclear device with a yield claimed to be in the neighborhood of \_\_\_\_\_ megatons. This test came as no surprise. It is plainly part of a crude attempt by the Soviet Union to terrorize and intimidate the rest of the world.

There exists no rational military purpose for the development of weapons in the 50-100 megaton bracket. The United States has long possessed the know-how and capacity to build thermo-nuclear weapons of far greater yield than any presently in the stockpiles of the nuclear powers. It has deliberately rejected this line of development. Careful study has shown that such weapons would answer no useful military requirement. On the contrary -- in terms of military effectiveness, cost, discriminate applicability and other factors -- such weapons merit no place in a military inventory.

Weapons in the 50-100 megaton category could be considered "efficient" in comparison with existing weapons only if populations are their target. In short, they are not instruments of military necessity, but of genocide.

The United States has the forces and weapons necessary to survive an initial general attack and to carry out a militarily effective retaliatory attack which would leave any aggressor



~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

146

impotent. The United States has no need to produce and stockpile super-megaton weapons which would not significantly increase this military capability. Neither has the United States any need nor desire to acquire weapons whose only justification would be to terrorize and intimidate other peoples.

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

14c

ATTACHMENT #3

NEW OUTLINE PLAN to Institute Certain Actions in Advance of Soviet 50-100 MT Test.

Background of Original Outline Plan:

Add additional paragraph as follows:

Should the Soviets undertake the actual testing of a 100 MT weapon or device, it can be assumed that they have determined to take such a step only after full consideration of the United States, and possibly other western nations, strongly protesting such a test and after evaluating probable world reaction.

Objectives:

The United States, after determining that a probability exists for the Soviets to undertake the test of a 100 MT device, should add the following objectives to the current public information program regarding the Soviet test program:

1. Solidify world opinion as <sup>to</sup> the dangers incident to any nation conducting such tests, with the view of preempting the initiative of the Soviets and possibly forcing them to cancel any plans to test a 50-100 MT device.
2. Develop plans which would prevent the loss of confidence throughout the world, and especially our allies, of the deterrent capability of the United States Armed Forces.
3. Discredit the Soviet Union as a member of the civilized world should the tests be undertaken.
4. Reassure the world public, if the Soviet tests are consummated, that the United States, confident in the face of such a development, continues to pursue measures of a reassuring military character and the development of peaceful uses of nuclear power regardless of Soviet steps.

SPECIFIC MEASURES

A. In pursuance of Objective I.

The United States should develop a well-coordinated national program to inform the world public of the dangers incipient in any nation initiating 100 MT tests. This program should be disseminated through scientific journals on a world-wide basis. USIA, CIA, STATE and other appropriate government

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6  
NLK 01-301-19-8  
By mmp NARA Date 1/10

~~SECRET~~

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10



14c

SECRET

agencies should likewise develop both scientific and general interest articles along the same lines. Particular attention should be devoted toward the encouragement of foreign nations and appropriate non-governmental groups within each to undertake a similar program. The United Nations Organization might well be useful toward the accomplishment of the desired objective through the submission of an appropriate Resolution.

B. In pursuance of Objectives 2, 3 and 4.

1. The United States should seek to reassure the world public that the event in no way adversely affects the deterrent capability of its Armed Forces. The world public should be given such data on nuclear weapons available to the United States to express the abundance and versatility of our nuclear weapons and the remaining superior delivery capability which the United States has maintained over the years.

2. Emphasis should be placed on the military reasons which may have forced the Soviets to engage in the development of a 100 MT weapon and thereby attack their vaunted superior military position by stressing such facts as lack of confidence in accurate delivery capability. Cost comparisons should be developed to emphasize that it is uneconomical to utilize such a weapon except to strike mass targets, i.e., cities.

3. Continue the development of the theme that the Soviet Union unilaterally endangers the world population. (This to be undertaken only if scientific data supports the program and does not inhibit the U.S. from testing smaller devices in the atmosphere.)

4. The theme might be developed that the Soviets are unilaterally taking steps which could ultimately destroy the populations of Africa and Asia.

5. Emphasize the irrationality of such a Soviet decision and its adverse affects upon humanity. Subtle references may be made relating the step to those taken by the Nazis in a campaign of genocide.

6. The United States must present an unperturbed attitude and not react in panic. There must be an emphasis on the orderly continuation of United States scientific, military and peaceful progress. Emphasis must be placed on the number of nuclear tests already accomplished by the U.S. and the USSR to emphasize not only our lead but to present subsequent tests as primarily continued development of nuclear weapons and nuclear peaceful projects as a means of retaining our considerable lead

SECRET



14c

~~SECRET~~

over the Soviets. It must be advanced that while Soviet events may continue, they in no way affect our own program and our own testing will continue according to the requirements.

In order to develop an overall program, precise and exact coordination must be established within the appropriate governmental departments and agencies. Specifically, the following responsibilities must be assumed as indicated.

STATE, DEFENSE, USIA AND AEC

An appropriate Presidential statement must be developed for use in the event time precludes the development of appropriate actions to be taken in advance of a Soviet 100 MT test.

STATE

As stated above. State must provide valid guidance with reference to the world political situation and specific area situations on which to base an effective world program of preparing the world public for the Soviet tests.

USIA

USIA must develop a valid program outlining actions by which the world wide public information program may be implemented prior to any Soviet event. A similar program must be developed for follow-on actions after a Soviet test under either the condition that the United States has implemented its program prior to any Soviet test or if the United States has not taken any actions prior to the test.

DEFENSE

The Department of Defense must develop data on the effects, advantages, and disadvantages of the use of a 100 MT weapon vis-a-vis smaller weapons. DoD must also prepare material relevant to the superiority of its nuclear delivery capability vis-a-vis the Soviet and the versatility of not only weapons but delivery means.

AEC

The Atomic Energy Commission must provide data on nuclear affects. Responsibility for collation of inputs for world wide dissemination and overall organization of a program to inform the world public is a joint responsibility between STATE and USIA.

3  
~~SECRET~~



15

**THE WHITE HOUSE**  
**WASHINGTON**

Mr. Rostow,

9/15/61

Will you want this for the meeting  
Saturday afternoon?





DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

15a  
(62)

1. ~~Rostow~~
2. ~~Gen. Taylor~~
3. Return to B.K.S.

September 13, 1961

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Possible Soviet Terror Measures

Enclosed is a paper prepared in the Department  
which may be of interest to you.

*L. D. Battle*  
L. D. Battle  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Research Memorandum (2 copies):  
Possible Soviet Terror Tactics


SECRET

211

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5
NLR-01R-301-1-4-2
By MP NARA, Date 10/12



511



SECRET

Possible Soviet Terror Tactics  
Researched Memorandum (5 copies):

Enclosures:

Spind  
press  
bonds, Turkey  
newborn  
burial  
M. & L.  
2-  
labor  
M. & L.  
Pump  
and

1 Split ①  
2  
3 New log in  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60  
61  
62  
63  
64  
65  
66  
67  
68  
69  
70  
71  
72  
73  
74  
75  
76  
77  
78  
79  
80  
81  
82  
83  
84  
85  
86  
87  
88  
89  
90  
91  
92  
93  
94  
95  
96  
97  
98  
99  
100

Subject: Possible Soviet Terror Measures

THE WHITE HOUSE  
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SECRET

September 13, 1961

3. Return to B.K. 2.  
1. ~~Return to B.K. 2.~~  
1. ~~Return to B.K. 2.~~



WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
ADDRESS: OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO



~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 3 pages.  
Copy No. 37 of 43 copies, Series A.

15a-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research Memorandum  
INR-6, September 11, 1961

TO : G - Mr. Johnson  
THROUGH: S/S  
FROM : INR - Roger Hilsman  
SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Terror Measures

In response to your request that we consider possibilities open to the Soviets in applying terror tactics, we have arrived at the following conclusions.

In furthering their objectives on Germany and Berlin the Soviets are increasingly resorting to the calculated pursuit of tension-raising, including terroristic, measures designed to intimidate the noncommunist world and generate worldwide public pressures for accommodation with the USSR. Notable among these measures, some of which have been motivated by other factors, were: Khrushchev's August 7 speech warning the Soviet people of the possibility of a catastrophic nuclear war; the August 13 closing of the East-West sector border in Berlin; and several steps taken toward a Soviet military buildup, the most dramatic of which was the August 30 announcement on Soviet resumption of nuclear tests, which was immediately followed by a rapid-fire series of nuclear explosions and accompanied by Khrushchev's avowal that the USSR would test "super" nuclear weapons in the 50-100 megaton range.

The cumulative effect of these Soviet actions and pronouncements so far has been to create a great deal more tension in international relations. A continuation of Soviet tension-raising measures seems certain. And it also seems likely that the Soviets will undertake some even more dramatic measures which, individually or collectively, could be classified under the heading of "terror tactics." Listed below are two categories of some possible measures.

A. DRAMATIC MOVES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Extensive Employment of Nuclear Weapons in Novaya Zemlya War Games. The Soviets have already announced naval maneuvers with "modern weapons" will be conducted in the Novaya Zemlya area from September 10 until November 15. Nuclear weapons were detonated during similar maneuvers which took place in the Novaya Zemlya area in October 1958. One high yield nuclear shot was fired there yesterday, and extensive and demonstrative use of nuclear weapons in these maneuvers may be expected.

~~SECRET~~



15a-1

SECRET

-2-

2. Large Nuclear Explosion at Very High Altitudes. We believe the Soviets wish to conduct nuclear tests in outer space. A test in outer space of a multi-megaton weapon would be visible in many parts of the world and, if detonated in the ionosphere, would cause temporarily an extreme disruption -- possibly a blackout -- of world communications.

3. Space Shot with Very Large Boosters. The boosters used for space and ICBM shots thus far are probably not sufficiently powerful for the 100 megaton warhead mentioned by Khrushchev. In order to demonstrate their capability to deliver multi-megaton warheads of that size, if in fact the Soviets have this capability, a space shot with a larger payload (manned or unmanned) might be attempted.

4. Explosion of Nuclear Weapon in Current Pacific Tests. Moscow announced yesterday that rocket tests for avowed purposes of future space exploration would be carried out in the Pacific area south of John<sup>4</sup> Island from September 13 to October 15. These tests are most likely part of the test series for a second generation ICBM and generally to demonstrate Soviet missile prowess. While the possibility should not be excluded that a nuclear warhead would be detonated in the Pacific -- say, within five to six hundred miles of Hawaii -- we do not regard this as likely because of technical risks involved in launching a live nuclear warhead which might traverse the space over foreign territory.

5. Nuclear Weapons Explosion in Outer Space. Explosion of a nuclear weapon of low-medium yield in far outer space is within Soviet capabilities. The demonstrative effect of this action is somewhat questionable; hence, we are inclined to think this move is unlikely.

6. Nuclear Interception of Satellite or Missile. The Soviets might attempt to shoot down a satellite or missile -- launched by themselves -- with a nuclear warhead. Either operation would strikingly underline Soviet missile prowess, and perhaps lend credence to Khrushchev's hint in his interview last week with Sulzberger that the Soviets already have an anti-ballistic-missile missile capability.

7. Test of New Nuclear Device. If the Soviets have achieved some breakthrough in nuclear weapons technology, then testing a new device at the present time would be another instance of terror tactics. We have no evidence that the USSR is in fact ready to test such new devices as a neutron bomb, an HE-to-fusion weapon, etc., but these possibilities cannot be entirely excluded.

#### B. CONVENTIONAL MOVES

There are several measures of a less dramatic and more conventional nature which the Soviet Union may undertake. Some of them have been already

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

-3-

foreshadowed by Soviet pronouncements. And their cumulative effect might contribute substantially to the awesome atmosphere of more dramatic actions.

1. Visible Display of Missiles in East Europe. The Soviets may visibly deploy some missiles in Eastern Europe, especially in East Germany. Surface to air missiles have already been publicly displayed in three bloc countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria); and the public appearance of Soviet IRBM's in East Germany may be presaged by Khrushchev's remark to Sulzberger last week that there were no missiles beyond the Soviet border except "possibly in East Germany."

2. Soviet Troop Moves Into East Europe. The dispatch of more Soviet troops into Eastern Europe -- probably to East Germany -- would fit well the previous Soviet pattern of asserted reaction to Western defense measures. Moscow has ostentatiously responded to Western defense buildup measures, and Khrushchev told McCloy last month he would send two divisions to Europe for every one the West sent. Our announced intention to send 40,000 US troops to Germany could serve as a ready pretext for a further Soviet troop buildup.

3. Warsaw Pact Maneuvers. Moscow announced yesterday that the Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Staff of the Warsaw Pact states had met in Warsaw September 8-9 and taken a decision on military preparedness measures in view of recent NATO "military preparations." The communist bloc states might undertake well publicized maneuvers of their forces in East Europe, particularly some aggressive demonstration in connection with NATO's forthcoming Checkmate II exercise in the Balkan area.

4. Display of Missile Launching Submarines. A particularly effective means under appropriate circumstances for a Soviet display of modern weapons might be the surfacing of several guided missile submarines in plain view of Western observers. A precedent for this type display was recently established when Western military attaches in Moscow witnessed at Soviet invitation Soviet troop maneuvers under conditions simulating use of atomic weapons.

5. ICBM Firings. In addition to, or in connection with, the Soviet missile tests already announced for the Pacific, Moscow might undertake ICBM firings with dummy warheads from bases previously unknown to Western intelligence. Even one or two such firings would create the presumption of the existence of a larger ICBM force than intelligence currently believes has been deployed.

6. Threat to Equip Soviet Ships with SAM's. Moscow has recently revived attention to its long standing complaints of alleged US buzzing of Soviet ships at sea. The Soviets might threaten to equip their vessels with surface to air missiles and shoot down planes engaged in observation exercises. Through such a threat the Soviets would not only heighten tension but hope to inhibit observation of Soviet naval and shipping activity.

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY

September 18, 1961

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walter Rostow  
The White House

Attached are three draft contingency papers on Soviet nuclear tests as revised in the light of discussions in my office on Saturday, September 16. I should appreciate your comments as soon as possible.

  
U. Alexis Johnson

Attachments.

SECRET



---

**JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

---

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTED ITEM HAS  
BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER:**

**ITEM: 16A**

**DATE: 9/18/61**

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:**

**DRAFT REPORT**

**PAGES: 6**

**CLASS: S**

**LOCATION:**

**NATIONAL SECURITY FILES**

**SUBJECTS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING,  
ROSTOW FILE, 7/21/61-9/26/61**

**BOX #: 301**



---

**JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

---

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTED ITEM HAS  
BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER:**

**ITEM: 16A-1**

**DATE: ../../61**

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:**

**DRAFT COMMENTS ON VERY HIGH YIELD NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS**

**PAGES: 3**

**CLASS: S**

**LOCATION:**

**NATIONAL SECURITY FILES**

**SUBJECTS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING,  
ROSTOW FILE, 7/21/61-9/26/61**

**BOX #: 301**



~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

## WHITE HOUSE CONTINGENCY STATEMENT

## ON SOVIET TESTING OF 50-100 MT DEVICE

The Soviet Union has succumbed to the temptation to explode an over-size thermonuclear device in a crude attempt to intimidate the world.

The Soviet decision to develop weapons of this size has no rational basis in terms of military planning. There have existed for some time weapons having sufficient power to destroy all types of military targets. In developing weapons of even higher yields, the Soviet Union seeks political, not military, advantage. It will find neither.

Furthermore, even if the Soviet Union believed that only through acquiring such weapons could it remedy deficiencies of its military strength and the bankruptcy of its political policies, the weapons could have been developed without an explosion of the magnitude of today's test and <sup>without</sup> its attendant hazards for mankind, including production of more radioactive fallout than any other test. There is not technical reason for testing such a device beyond a relatively small-scale detonation to confirm basic design.

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

16a-2-

-2-

Under these circumstances, we must conclude that the purpose of today's test--and indeed the purpose of such a weapon itself--is to attempt to spread terror and increase tensions throughout the world, and so to intimidate free men that they will timorously accept Soviet demands which reason rejects and conscience opposes. This attempt will fail.

Terror is not a new weapon. Throughout human history it has been used by those who could not prevail by persuasion. They usually failed because, in most instances, they under-estimated the strength of the human spirit.

Those who would intimidate free men today should remember also that the United States, which is committed to the preservation of freedom, has more than enough military power to destroy those who would unleash a war by aggression.

As a great nation commanding vast resources of power, the United States is fully aware of its responsibility for cool and sober conduct in matters which may involve the destiny of millions of people. We are prepared, now as ever, to enter into serious negotiations for

SECRET



SECRET

16a-2

-3-

disarmament. We are prepared, now as ever, to enter into serious negotiations for banning nuclear testing.

At the same time, in the absence of serious and successful negotiations, we will continue to take measures necessary to preserve the security of our country and of others who count on us.

The Soviet leachers should not delude themselves. They have failed to intimidate us today, and they will continue to fail.

SECRET



*gunt*

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 21, 1961

*File for  
quick  
reference*

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable  
Walt Rostow,  
Deputy Special Assistant to the President  
for International Security Affairs,  
The White House.

SUBJECT: Contingency Plan for U.S. Response to Soviet  
Nuclear Test Suspension

As a supplement to the paper on Soviet testing now under discussion, Alex Johnson has asked me to forward for your consideration and comment the enclosed draft, which suggests a U.S. response to a possible Soviet announcement of a new nuclear test suspension.

*Philip J. Farley*  
Philip J. Farley

Enclosure:

(1) Contingency Plan  
Copy 3 of 11 Draft

When separated from at ~~no~~ *document*  
handle this Document as OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SECRET





DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 21, 1961

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable  
Walt Rostow,  
Deputy Special Assistant to the President  
for International Security Affairs,  
The White House.

SUBJECT: Contingency Plan for U.S. Response to Soviet  
Nuclear Test Suspension

As a supplement to the paper on Soviet testing now under discussion, Alex Johnson has asked me to forward for your consideration and comment the enclosed draft, which suggests a U.S. response to a possible Soviet announcement of a new nuclear test suspension.

Philip J. Farley

Enclosure:

(1) Contingency Plan  
Copy 3 of 11 Draft

When separated from attachment  
handle this Document

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SECRET



SECRETDRAFTThis document consists of 6 pages.  
Number 3 of 11 copies, Series Draft

OUTLINE OF CONTINGENCY PLAN  
FOR U. S. RESPONSE TO NEW SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST  
SUSPENSION

BACKGROUND

1. The Soviet Union is conducting its present series of tests at a rapid rate. Although its purpose in maintaining such a rate is not clear, one effect is likely to be the early completion of the Soviet series, well in advance of the completion of tests by the United States, which is prevented by operational problems of underground testing from conducting more than a few tests a month. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union might announce a new test suspension and perhaps stimulate United Nations action to call for adherence by the United States and its allies.\*

ALTERNATIVES

2. The United States would have three principal courses of action open to it:

---

\*The Soviet statement might provide the vehicle for making public certain of its test results, e.g., development of a 100 MT weapon or improved air defense capabilities (possibly including anti-missile capabilities.) A full response by the United States would have to take into account any such statements. The present paper is limited to consideration of the test suspension issue.

SECRET



SECRET

17a

-2-

a. The United States could call a halt to its own tests. It is assumed here that this alternative may be undesirable from the point of view of national security. In addition, it might be undesirable politically since it could convey an impression of weakness on our part as well as possibly leaving the impression in some quarters that the Soviet Union was actually stronger militarily as a result of its more extensive test series.

b. A second course of action would be to continue testing without making a direct response to the Soviet statement. While this might, in some respects, be the most forceful action we could take, it would leave the public forum entirely to the Soviet Union, and it would not be consistent with our general posture of always being prepared to negotiate.

c. The most desirable approach, then, appears to be to continue testing and to make a direct response to the Soviet statement. This might be accompanied with renewed emphasis on or publicity respecting Project VELA, the United States program for improving nuclear test detection capabilities, as evidence of the United States desire for an effective test ban.

SECRET



SECRET

17a

-3-

CONTENT OF STATEMENT

3. A White House statement responding to the Soviet announcement might include some or all of the following points:

a. Announcement of our intention to proceed with our own test series, placing responsibility squarely on the Soviet Union for its disruption of the test-ban negotiations (and ~~perhaps~~ <sup>carefully</sup> noting the impossibility of determining whether the Soviet Union is actually observing its declared test suspension.)

b. Implication that in proceeding with our tests, we do not consider ourselves limited to underground testing.

c. Identification of the measures enabling the Soviet Union to complete its tests rapidly, e.g., extensive preparations accomplished while it feigned negotiations on a test ban, and use of atmospheric testing without regard to consequences for others.

d. Identification of reasons for the prolonged character of United States tests, e.g., our restraint during negotiations and in our present mode of conducting tests.

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

17a

-4-

e. Estimate of the duration of our present series  
(without implying a continuing suspension following completion  
of the series.)

f. Affirmation of our continued desire for an  
enforceable test ban (and broader disarmament agreement);  
reference to the VELA effort to improve nuclear test detection  
capabilities.

4. A draft contingency statement is attached.

Attachment:

Draft contingency statement.

September 20, 1961:11s

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

17a-1

DRAFT CONTINGENCY STATEMENT  
IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT  
OF A NEW SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR TESTS

The United States notes today's announcement by the Soviet Union that it is once again suspending nuclear testing.

The value of such a Soviet announcement has been demonstrated by its past actions: the Soviet Union can be expected to observe such a suspension only for the period that may be required to prepare a new series of tests; then, whether with a view to seeking military advantage or to punctuating threats of nuclear blackmail, it can be expected to resume testing.

The "off-again-on-again" approach of the Soviet Union does not contribute to the solution of the problem of nuclear testing. Had the Soviet Union agreed, a ban prohibiting tests hazardous to others could have been in effect today, and an international effort looking toward solution of the problems involved in prohibiting all types of nuclear tests would be well advanced.

The United States still desires such an agreement. Through our VELA program, which as its specific objective the improvement of nuclear test detection capabilities, we will continue the studies and experiments needed to lay the groundwork for the effective, comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests desired by all Free World countries.



SECRET

-2-

In its thoughtless scramble to complete the greatest possible number of tests in the shortest period of time, the Soviet Union, heedless of consequences, conducted fallout-producing tests in many instances where underground tests would have sufficed. Despite the delays inherent in underground testing and the resulting prolongation of our test series, we shall continue, in all cases where it is possible to do so, to avoid atmospheric tests and thereby to eliminate all possibility of hazard to others.

September 20, 1961:11s

SECRET





SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

September 26, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Honorable  
Walt Rostow,  
Deputy Special Assistant to the President  
for International Security Affairs,  
The White House.

SUBJECT: Contingency Plans Concerning Current Soviet Nuclear Tests.

Enclosed are drafts of plans for certain U.S. actions in two possible contingencies: (1) Soviet test of very high yield nuclear weapon (Tab A); and (2) Soviet announcement of new nuclear test suspension (Tab B).

Draft Plan Tab A takes into account the comments and written suggestions received by Deputy Under Secretary Johnson as of September 25. Would you please let me know your reaction to the present draft and indicate whether you think another meeting with Mr. Johnson on this plan would be desirable? If so, we would like to schedule it as early as possible.

Draft Plan Tab B has been revised in the light of discussion at last Friday's meeting in this office. Additional comments would be welcome and we are proceeding to obtain the views of USUN. Unless there are suggestions for substantial changes, no further meeting on this plan is contemplated at the moment.

*Philip J. Farley*  
Philip J. Farley

Special Assistant to the Secretary  
for Atomic Energy and Outer Space

Attachments:

- Tab A - U.S. Approach to Pol.-Psycho. Aspects of Sov. Claims (and Testing) of 50-100 MT Weapons, 9/25/61 (Cy 4, Draft)
- Tab B - Outline of Contingency Plan for U.S. Response to New Sov. Nuc. Test Suspension, 9/25/61 (Cy 4, Draft)

SECRET





DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 26, 1961

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Honorable  
Walt Rostow,  
Deputy Special Assistant to the President  
for International Security Affairs,  
The White House.

SUBJECT: Contingency Plans Concerning Current Soviet Nuclear Tests.

Enclosed are drafts of plans for certain U.S. actions in two possible contingencies: (1) Soviet test of very high yield nuclear weapon (Tab A); and (2) Soviet announcement of new nuclear test suspension (Tab B).

Draft Plan Tab A takes into account the comments and written suggestions received by Deputy Under Secretary Johnson as of September 25. Would you please let me know your reaction to the present draft and indicate whether you think another meeting with Mr. Johnson on this plan would be desirable? If so, we would like to schedule it as early as possible.

Draft Plan Tab B has been revised in the light of discussion at last Friday's meeting in this office. Additional comments would be welcome and we are proceeding to obtain the views of USUN. Unless there are suggestions for substantial changes, no further meeting on this plan is contemplated at the moment.

Philip J. Farley  
Special Assistant to the Secretary  
for Atomic Energy and Outer Space

Attachments:

- Tab A - U.S. Approach to Pol.-Psycho. Aspects of Sov. Claims (and Testing) of 50-100 MT Weapons, 9/25/61 (Cy 4, Draft)
- Tab B - Outline of Contingency Plan for U.S. Response to New Sov. Nuc. Test Suspension, 9/25/61 (Cy 4, Draft)

**SECRET**



---

**JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

---

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTED ITEM HAS  
BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER:**

**ITEM: 18A**

**DATE: 9/25/61**

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:**

**DRAFT REPORT**

**PAGES: 7**

**CLASS: S**

**LOCATION:**

**NATIONAL SECURITY FILES**

**SUBJECTS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING,  
ROSTOW FILE, 7/21/61-9/26/61**

**BOX #: 301**



---

**JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

---

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTED ITEM HAS  
BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER:**

**ITEM: 18A-1**

**DATE: ../../61**

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:**

**DRAFT COMMENTS ON VERY HIGH YIELD NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS**

**PAGES: 3**

**CLASS: S**

**LOCATION:**

**NATIONAL SECURITY FILES**

**SUBJECTS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING,  
ROSTOW FILE, 7/21/61-9/26/61**

**BOX #: 301**



SECRET  
DRAFTWHITE HOUSE CONTINGENCY STATEMENT  
ON SOVIET TESTING OF 50-100 MT DEVICE

The Soviet Union today detonated a \_\_\_MT nuclear device in an apparent attempt to intimidate the world, since it is not clear that this device would serve any real military purpose.

The Soviet device has little more destructive power, and no greater military effectiveness, than nuclear weapons now available. In developing weapons of even higher yields, the Soviet Union seeks political, more than military, advantage. It will find neither.

Furthermore, even if the Soviet Union believed that only through acquiring such weapons could it remedy deficiencies of its military strength and the bankruptcy of its political policies, the weapons could have been developed without an explosion of the magnitude of today's test and without its attendant hazards for mankind, including production of more radioactive fallout than any other test. There is no technical reason for testing such a device beyond a relatively small-scale detonation to confirm basic design.

---

\*Bracketed portion to be deleted if test takes place in outer space.

SECRET



SECRET

18a-2

-2-

Under these circumstances, we must conclude that the purpose of today's test--and indeed the purpose of such a weapon itself--is to attempt to spread terror and increase tensions throughout the world, and so to intimidate free men that they will timorously accept Soviet demands which reason rejects and conscience opposes. This attempt will fail.

Terror is not a new weapon. Throughout human history it has been used by those who could not prevail by persuasion. They usually failed because they under-estimated the strength of the human spirit.

Those who would intimidate free men today should remember also that the United States, which is committed to the preservation of freedom, has more than enough military power to destroy those who would unleash a war by aggression.

As a great nation commanding vast resources of power, the United States is fully aware of its responsibility for cool and sober conduct in matters which may involve the destiny of millions of people. Thus while possessing the capability to add extremely high-yield nuclear weapons to our arsenal, we have not tested nor produced such weapons because our essential military power does not require them.

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

18a-2

-3-

We are prepared, now as ever, to enter into serious negotiations for disarmament. We are prepared, now as ever, to enter into serious negotiations for banning nuclear testing.

At the same time, we will continue to take measures necessary to preserve the security of our country and of others who count on us.

The Soviet leaders should not delude themselves. They have failed to intimidate us today, and they will continue to fail.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~  
~~DRAFT~~

9/25/61 W. W. Rostow

OUTLINE OF CONTINGENCY PLAN  
FOR U. S. RESPONSE TO NEW SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST  
SUSPENSION

BACKGROUND

1. The Soviet Union is conducting its present series of tests at a rapid rate. Although its purpose in maintaining such a rate is not clear, one effect is likely to be the early completion of the Soviet series, before our own tests are well under way, since we are prevented by the operational problems of underground testing from conducting more than a few tests a month. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union might announce a new test suspension and perhaps stimulate United Nations action to call for adherence by the United States and its allies.\*

ALTERNATIVES

2. The United States would have three principal courses of action open to it:

\*The Soviet statement might provide the vehicle for making public certain of its test results, e.g., development of a 100 MT weapon or improved air defense capabilities (possibly including anti-missile capabilities.) A full response by the United States would have to take into account any such statements. The present paper is limited to consideration of the test suspension issue.

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

-2-

a. The United States could call a halt to its own tests. It is assumed here that this alternative may be undesirable from the point of view of national security, in the absence of an acceptable test ban agreement. In addition, it might be undesirable politically since it could convey an impression of weakness on our part as well as possibly leaving the impression in some quarters that the Soviet Union was actually stronger militarily as a result of its more extensive test series.

b. A second course of action would be to continue testing without making a direct response to the Soviet statement. While this might, in some respects, be the most forceful action we could take, it would leave the public forum entirely to the Soviet Union, and it would not be consistent with our general posture of always being prepared to negotiate.

c. The most desirable approach, then, appears to be to continue testing and to make a direct response to the Soviet statement, noting the importance of our tests for security of the Free World, including our program for improving nuclear test detection capabilities.

SECRET



SECRET

-3-

CONTENT OF STATEMENT

3. A White House statement responding to the Soviet announcement might include some or all of the following points:

a. Announcement of our intention to proceed with our own tests which are important to the security of the Free World, placing responsibility squarely on the Soviet Union for its disruption of the test-ban negotiations (and perhaps noting the impossibility of determining whether the Soviet Union is actually observing its declared test suspension.)

b. Identification of the measures enabling the Soviet Union to complete its tests rapidly, e.g., extensive preparations accomplished while it feigned negotiations on a test ban, and use of atmospheric testing without regard to consequences for others.

c. Identification of reasons for the prolonged character of United States tests, e.g., our restraint during negotiations and in our present mode of conducting tests.

SECRET



186  
SECRET

-4-

d. Affirmation of our continued desire for an enforceable test ban (and broader disarmament agreement); reference to the VELA effort to improve nuclear test detection capabilities (not as a justification for continued testing but rather as evidence of our desire to lay the groundwork for an enforceable test ban).

4. The United States response should avoid implying either that we will continue testing indefinitely or that we have yet defined conditions (short of immediate agreement to the proposed treaty) under which we would be prepared to stop. In this connection it is noted that United States policy has not been developed with respect to the following:

a. Whether we would stop during a resumption of negotiations or at any time prior to signing of a satisfactory agreement.

b. Whether we would now accept a unilaterally enforced ban on atmospheric testing such as that previously offered to the Soviet Union.

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

186

-5-

5. It is noted also that a report has been made to the President by Defense and AEC bearing on the possible need of the United States to conduct atmospheric tests.

Attachment: Draft Contingency Statement

~~SECRET~~



186-1

SECRET

DRAFT CONTINGENCY STATEMENT  
IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT  
OF A NEW SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR TESTS

The United States notes today's announcement by the Soviet Union that it is once again suspending nuclear testing. The Soviet statement must be interpreted in the light of the hard facts of history.

First, the Soviet Union, and it alone, bears responsibility for the resumption of nuclear testing.

Second, the rapidity with which the Soviet Union has completed its tests reflects the extensive preparations made silently behind the Iron Curtain during the period when Soviet representatives came daily to the conference table in Geneva prolonging negotiations until test plans were complete.

Third, in its thoughtless scramble to complete the greatest possible number of tests in the shortest period of time, the Soviet Union, heedless of consequences, chose to conduct quick, fallout-producing tests where underground tests, though more prolonged, would have been free of fallout and would have sufficed.

Under the circumstances, the Soviet Union can be expected to observe a new suspension only for the period required to

SECRET



186-1

SECRET

-2-

prepare more tests; then, whether to renege on new negotiations, to seek military advantage, or to punctuate new threats of nuclear blackmail, it can be expected to resume testing.

For its own part, the United States, in the interest of the Security of the Free World, has no alternative other than to continue the tests now under way. However, despite the delays inherent in underground testing, we shall, in all cases where it is possible to do so, avoid atmospheric tests and thereby eliminate all possibility of hazard to others.

The "on-again-off-again" approach of the Soviet Union has not contributed to solution of the problem of nuclear testing. Had the Soviet Union agreed, a ban prohibiting tests hazardous to others could have been in effect today, and an international effort looking toward solution of the problems involved in prohibiting all types of nuclear tests would be well advanced.

The United States still desires such an agreement. Through our VELA program which has as its specific objective the improvement of nuclear test detection capabilities, we will

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

-3-

continue the studies and experiments needed to lay the groundwork for the effective, comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests desired by all Free World countries.

~~SECRET~~